The Alaska Gambit: A Trump-Putin Summit and the Forging of a New World Order

This report provides a comprehensive geostrategic analysis of the proposed Trump-Putin summit in Alaska, arguing that the meeting is not a genuine pursuit of peace in Ukraine but a high-stakes gambit to reshape the global order. The central thesis is that the summit is driven by the “Reverse Nixon” doctrine, a flawed U.S. strategy aimed at fracturing the deep Sino-Russian entente to counter China, which is viewed as America’s primary long-term adversary. This report contends that such a strategy is a “geopolitical fantasy,” as it misreads the historical conditions of the 1970s and fundamentally underestimates the resilience of the modern partnership between Moscow and Beijing.

The Sino-Russian entente is presented not as a temporary axis of convenience but as a durable alignment forged through deep geoeconomic interdependence, military-technical cooperation, and a shared ideological opposition to the U.S.-led liberal international order. This “Axis of Upheaval” also integrates other revisionist states like Iran and North Korea, which provide critical military support to sustain Russia’s war effort.

The report argues that the pursuit of this “Reverse Nixon” strategy carries immense and irreversible costs. Ukraine is treated as a sacrificial pawn, with its sovereignty and territorial integrity offered as concessions. This unilateral, bilateral approach threatens to shatter the transatlantic alliance, alienating NATO and EU partners by negotiating over their heads and undermining the principle of collective security. Such a deal would set a dangerous global precedent, rewarding aggression and eroding the foundations of international law.

The analysis extends to the broader “New Great Game,” assessing the complex calculations of other rising powers. India is positioned on a strategic tightrope, balancing its partnerships with both the U.S. and Russia. Meanwhile, the BRICS+ bloc, representing the Global South, is poised to leverage the fracturing of the Western-led order to advance its vision of a multipolar world.

Finally, the report assesses the probabilities of the summit’s outcomes, concluding that a genuine “Grand Bargain” is highly improbable. The most likely scenarios are either a “Transactional Pause”—a temporary ceasefire that strategically benefits Russia by allowing it to rearm and consolidate gains—or an “Acrimonious Collapse,” which would drive Russia and China even closer together. The report concludes that the Alaska summit, regardless of its outcome, signals a dangerous shift toward a more volatile, transactional era of great-power competition, risking long-term global stability for the illusion of a quick peace.

I. Introduction: A Summit at the World’s Crossroads

In the stark and strategically vital landscape of Alaska, a high-stakes diplomatic encounter is poised to unfold, carrying with it the potential to fundamentally reshape the contours of the 21st-century international order. The proposed summit between United States President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin is far more than a bilateral negotiation over the war in Ukraine; it represents the public face of an audacious and deeply controversial American gambit. The central thesis animating this meeting, pursued by a significant school of thought within the American foreign policy establishment, is that the path to containing the United States’ primary long-term rival—the People’s Republic of China—runs directly through Moscow.

This report will argue that to view the Alaska summit as a quest for European peace is to miss the forest for the trees. The meeting is a pivotal move in a much larger, high-stakes geopolitical contest, a “New Great Game” where the sovereignty of Ukraine and the security architecture of Europe are being treated as instruments of strategic leverage—bargaining chips in a transactional play to reorder the global balance of power. The choice of Alaska as the venue is itself symbolic, a location physically and politically removed from the traditional centers of European diplomacy, underscoring the bilateral and transactional nature of the proposed talks. It serves as a geographic pivot point, situated between the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific theaters of great-power competition, highlighting the global scope of the intended realignment.

The stakes are immense. The summit’s agenda is driven by the audacious “Reverse Nixon” doctrine, a strategy that seeks to fracture the burgeoning Sino-Russian axis by luring Moscow away from its deepening partnership with Beijing. This report will provide a comprehensive geostrategic, geoeconomic, and geopolitical assessment of this gambit. It will first deconstruct the flawed logic of the “Reverse Nixon” theory, demonstrating its inapplicability to contemporary realities. It will then provide an exhaustive analysis of the Sino-Russian entente, arguing that its multidimensional nature makes it resilient to such wedge strategies. Subsequently, the report will detail the profound costs of this pivot for Ukraine and the transatlantic alliance, expand the analysis to the strategic calculations of other rising powers such as India, Iran, and North Korea, and assess the potential impact on institutions of global governance like the United Nations, NATO, and BRICS. Finally, it will conclude with a probabilistic assessment of the summit’s potential for success or failure, arguing that the pursuit of a transactional peace is likely to produce an illusory calm while accelerating the fragmentation of the global order.

II. The “Reverse Nixon” Doctrine: A Strategic Analysis of a Geopolitical Fantasy

The strategic thinking underpinning the Alaska summit is a direct echo of one of the Cold War’s most celebrated diplomatic maneuvers: National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger’s opening to China in the 1970s. That move brilliantly exploited the deep ideological and military Sino-Soviet split, positioning the United States as the “pivot player” in a strategic triangle and fundamentally fracturing the communist bloc. The modern application of this theory, dubbed the “Reverse Nixon” gambit, simply swaps the players. It identifies China as the preeminent, long-term adversary to U.S. global leadership—a comprehensive economic, military, and ideological challenger. Within this framework, Russia, while a disruptive regional power, is viewed primarily as China’s most important collaborator. The overarching goal, as President Trump himself has stated, is to “un-unite” them.

This is not an abstract theory but a concrete policy objective advocated by prominent figures. The proposed quid pro quo is explicit: the United States would grant Russia “major concessions,” including freezing the current lines of control in Ukraine and making a permanent commitment that Ukraine will not join NATO. In return, as articulated by figures like Vivek Ramaswamy, “Russia has to leave its treaty and its joint military agreement with China”. The logic is starkly transactional: ending the Ukraine war on terms favorable to Moscow is deemed a necessary sacrifice to break the Sino-Russian alliance. However, this approach amounts to a geopolitical fantasy, bereft of an understanding of both the conditions that made the original Nixon gambit possible and the fundamentally different nature of the contemporary alignment between Moscow and Beijing.

Deconstructing the Fantasy: Why 2025 is Not 1972

The attempt to apply a 1970s strategic template to the 2025 geopolitical landscape is fundamentally flawed for three primary reasons: the absence of structural preconditions, a complete misalignment of incentives, and a critical lack of U.S. leverage.

First, the structural conditions that enabled Nixon’s opening to China are entirely absent today. Nixon’s diplomacy was predicated on an “entrenched Sino-Soviet ideological division and military confrontation,” China’s “self-imposed isolation during the Cultural Revolution,” and the American desire to “extricate itself from its war in Vietnam”. In stark contrast, the contemporary Sino-Russian relationship is at an “unprecedented high level,” characterized by deep cooperation, not conflict.

Second, Kissinger’s triangular diplomacy relied on manipulating the “natural incentives and propensities of the players”. In 2025, the incentives for both Moscow and Beijing point unequivocally toward more, not less, cooperation. Both regimes, led by Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, share a worldview that sees the U.S.-led liberal international order as the primary threat to their great-power ambitions and domestic regime security. This shared perception of threat provides a powerful centripetal force that a U.S. diplomatic overture is unlikely to overcome.

Third, the United States lacks the compelling leverage it once held. In the 1970s, Washington could offer Beijing a pathway out of isolation and access to Western technology and markets. Today, the U.S. has few positive incentives to offer Moscow. As a net energy exporter, the U.S. has no need for Russian resources, and it certainly will not purchase Russian arms—the two pillars of Russia’s economy. The primary economic tools in the U.S. arsenal are punitive sanctions, which serve to drive Russia further into China’s embrace, not pull it away.

The advocacy for this strategy reveals a profound schism within American foreign policy. It marks a clear departure from traditional liberal internationalism, which prioritizes alliances and a rules-based order, toward a transactional, “America First” realism. President Trump’s first term was characterized by this nationalist and unilateral approach, marked by skepticism toward NATO and withdrawal from multilateral agreements. The “Reverse Nixon” gambit is the ultimate expression of this worldview—a willingness to sacrifice an ally (Ukraine) and alienate an entire alliance (NATO) for a perceived bilateral gain with an adversary. Therefore, the Alaska summit is not merely a policy choice but a manifestation of a fundamental, ongoing battle for the soul of U.S. grand strategy.

Furthermore, a failed attempt to split the Russia-China axis will not simply return the world to the status quo; it will actively strengthen the very entente it seeks to break. The public U.S. overture to Russia, complete with offers of major concessions, provides concrete validation for the shared narrative in Moscow and Beijing of U.S. hostility and its desire to undermine their partnership. This will inevitably increase their mutual dependence. For China, such a scenario provides immense leverage. Russia, having been publicly solicited by Washington, would be compelled to demonstrate its loyalty to Beijing, potentially offering even more favorable terms on energy or military technology to reaffirm the “no limits” partnership. Consequently, a failed summit becomes a strategic own-goal for the United States, leaving the Sino-Russian partnership more cohesive, ideologically unified, and resistant to future diplomatic pressure than ever before.

III. The Sino-Russian Entente: An Axis of Convenience or a Durable Alliance?

Any strategy predicated on driving a wedge between Moscow and Beijing fundamentally underestimates the depth, resilience, and multidimensional nature of their partnership. What has emerged is not a temporary axis of convenience but a durable entente forged through deep geoeconomic interdependence, unprecedented military-technical cooperation, and a powerful ideological convergence. This relationship has been deliberately cultivated for over a decade and has only accelerated since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Geoeconomic Interdependence: A Sanction-Proof Lifeline

The economic ties between Russia and China form the bedrock of their strategic alignment. Bilateral trade reached a record value of $245 billion in 2024, more than doubling the total from 2020. This economic lifeline has been crucial for Moscow in circumventing Western sanctions. Russia has effectively become China’s “fuel station,” a secure and discounted source of hydrocarbons, metals, and agricultural products. In return, China has become an irreplaceable supplier of consumer goods, electronics, vehicles, and, critically, dual-use technologies and machine tools that sustain Russia’s war effort.

Beyond trade in goods, the two nations are actively constructing an alternative financial architecture to insulate themselves from U.S.-led financial warfare. The use of the Chinese Yuan in the Russian economy has surged dramatically. Following U.S. sanctions on the Moscow Stock Exchange, the Yuan’s proportion of transactions rose to 54% by May 2024 and has since approached nearly 100%. This de-dollarization effort, coupled with the adoption of China’s Cross-border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) as an alternative to SWIFT, significantly blunts the impact of Western sanctions and deepens Russia’s integration into a Sino-centric economic sphere.

While the relationship is marked by a growing asymmetry, with Russia increasingly cast as the “junior partner” or “resource appendage,” this dynamic currently serves to bind Moscow more tightly to Beijing. Having burned its bridges with the West, Russia has no viable economic or technological alternatives to China. This dependency limits Moscow’s strategic autonomy and makes the prospect of it abandoning its most critical partner for an uncertain rapprochement with its primary adversary strategically untenable.

Military and Technological Cooperation: A Partnership Forged in Steel

The geoeconomic partnership is mirrored by deepening military and technological collaboration. In 2024, Russia and China conducted an all-time high of 11 joint military exercises, a clear signal of their coordinated anti-U.S. posture. These drills have evolved from symbolic gestures to complex operational training in areas such as anti-submarine warfare, air defense, and joint gunnery exercises, enhancing interoperability between their forces.

This cooperation extends to the transfer of sensitive military technology. In what appears to be a symbiotic military-industrial loop, Russia has provided China with advanced submarine and missile technology, while China supplies Russia with the critical dual-use components—such as semiconductors, navigation equipment, and machine tools—that its sanctions-starved defense industry needs to produce modern weaponry. This exchange ensures that Russia’s war machine can be sustained while simultaneously advancing China’s long-term military modernization goals.

Ideological Convergence: A Shared Vision for a Post-Western World

Underpinning the economic and military ties is a powerful ideological convergence. Both Moscow and Beijing are united by a common rejection of what they perceive as a U.S.-led, hegemonic, and anachronistic international order. They actively advocate for a “multipolar” world order, a concept that, in practice, translates to a system of great-power spheres of influence where the principles of state sovereignty and non-interference trump liberal democratic values. This alignment is reinforced by a shared interest in authoritarian solidarity; both regimes view Western promotion of democracy and human rights not as a normative good but as a tool of political subversion aimed at undermining their domestic stability and regime security.

This entente should not be viewed as a traditional, hierarchical Cold War-style alliance. Rather, it functions as a flexible, networked coalition—an “Axis of Upheaval”—that integrates other revisionist states like Iran and North Korea in specific, transactional roles. Within this network, there is a clear division of labor. North Korea, in exchange for Russian food, fuel, and advanced military technology, provides the low-tech, high-volume munitions—millions of artillery shells and ballistic missiles—that Russia needs for a war of attrition. Iran supplies thousands of Shahed drones and other military hardware, deepening its own strategic partnership with Moscow. China, meanwhile, plays the role of the indispensable senior partner, providing the high-tech, dual-use components, the economic ballast, and the diplomatic top cover that Russia’s own industrial base cannot generate. This 21st-century model of authoritarian cooperation is far more resilient and adaptable than a rigid, formal bloc, allowing its members to contribute based on their respective capabilities without the constraints of a formal mutual defense treaty.

IV. The Price of the Pivot: Ukraine and the Transatlantic Fracture

The pursuit of the Alaska gambit, regardless of its outcome, carries immense and potentially irreversible costs. The strategic “pivot” to Russia comes at the direct expense of Ukrainian sovereignty and the cohesion of the transatlantic alliance, the very pillars of the Western response to Russian aggression. The collateral damage of this high-risk maneuver threatens to undermine the principles of international law and unravel decades of U.S.-led alliance-building.

Ukraine as the Sacrificial Lamb

At the heart of the proposed deal is the treatment of Ukraine not as a sovereign nation with the right to self-determination, but as a geopolitical pawn to be sacrificed on the altar of great-power competition. The core concessions reportedly under consideration involve freezing the conflict along the current lines of control, implicitly or explicitly recognizing Russian territorial gains, and providing a permanent commitment that Ukraine will not be permitted to join NATO.

Such an arrangement would constitute a catastrophic betrayal of Ukraine. It would directly validate Vladimir Putin’s core war aim: the denial of Ukraine’s statehood and its right to choose its own alliances and security arrangements. Ukrainian officials, from President Volodymyr Zelenskyy down, have unequivocally and repeatedly stated that they will not accept their own capitulation or the ceding of territory. Therefore, any “deal” struck in Alaska over Kyiv’s head would not lead to a sustainable peace. Instead, it would create a frozen conflict on Russia’s terms, rewarding the aggressor and ensuring that hostilities would inevitably resume once Moscow has had time to rearm and regroup.

The Fracture of NATO and the EU

The unilateral, bilateral nature of the Alaska summit poses an existential threat to the Western alliance. A deal negotiated directly between the U.S. and Russia, “over the heads of U.S. allies,” would shatter the transatlantic unity that has been the single most effective tool in confronting Russian aggression. European leaders have been largely sidelined from the process, forced to issue public appeals for their interests to be protected and to reiterate foundational principles that the summit’s premise calls into question, such as “the path to peace in Ukraine cannot be decided without Ukraine”.

A U.S.-Russia agreement on Ukrainian neutrality would effectively grant Moscow a veto over NATO’s future enlargement, hollowing out the alliance’s foundational “open door policy”. This would send a chilling message to allies on NATO’s eastern flank, suggesting that American security guarantees are not sacrosanct but are conditional and subject to transactional bargains with adversaries. Such a move would destroy the credibility of the alliance, forcing the European Union to accelerate its pursuit of “strategic autonomy” and potentially leading to a permanent divergence of security interests between Europe and the United States.

The very act of legitimizing the seizure of territory through force in a bilateral deal with the aggressor would establish a catastrophic international precedent, creating a global moral hazard. The post-World War II international order, enshrined in the United Nations Charter, is built upon the core principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Alaska summit proposes to resolve a conflict born from a flagrant violation of these principles not through international law, but through a raw, power-based negotiation that rewards the aggressor. This would send an unmistakable signal to other revisionist powers—most notably China with respect to Taiwan—that the principle of territorial integrity is negotiable. It suggests that if an aggressor is powerful enough to withstand initial sanctions and force a direct negotiation with the United States, its territorial gains can be legitimized. This logic incentivizes aggression globally, as the potential reward (conquest legitimized by a great power) would appear to outweigh the risk of sustained, unified international opposition. In effect, it would dismantle the normative foundation that has, however imperfectly, deterred great-power war for decades.

V. The New Great Game: A Multipolar World in Flux

The strategic calculus behind the Alaska summit, focused on a U.S.-Russia-China triangle, dangerously oversimplifies a global landscape that is increasingly multipolar. A host of other powerful actors are pursuing their own interests with growing agency, and their reactions to a U.S.-Russia deal will create complex and unpredictable ripple effects across the globe. This is the “New Great Game,” a 21st-century contest for influence played not on a bipolar or tripolar board, but on a multipolar chessboard.

India’s Tightrope: The Art of Strategic Autonomy

India finds itself in a particularly complex and delicate position. As a key member of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad), it is a vital U.S. partner in the strategy to balance a rising China in the Indo-Pacific. This partnership is driven by New Delhi’s own deep-seated strategic concerns about Beijing’s assertiveness along their shared border and across the region.

Simultaneously, India maintains a deep, decades-long defense and energy relationship with Russia. It has steadfastly refused to join Western sanctions, dramatically increasing its purchases of discounted Russian oil since 2022 and continuing to rely on Moscow for a significant portion of its military hardware. New Delhi’s foreign policy is defined by a fierce commitment to “strategic autonomy,” a doctrine that allows it to maintain maneuverability and engage with all major powers without being locked into a formal alliance.

From this perspective, the Alaska summit is fraught with peril. A U.S.-Russia rapprochement that strengthens Moscow, or a potential U.S.-China détente that might follow, would both be problematic for India, as either outcome could limit its strategic space. Furthermore, Washington’s transactional approach creates direct friction. Punitive U.S. tariffs imposed on India for its continued energy trade with Russia are perceived in New Delhi not just as an economic issue, but as a direct challenge to its sovereign right to make its own foreign policy choices. Such pressure risks pushing India away from the West and closer to alternative platforms like the BRICS bloc, where its desire for a multipolar order is more readily embraced.

The Axis of Upheaval: Iran and North Korea as Kingmakers

The war in Ukraine has dramatically elevated the strategic importance of Iran and North Korea, transforming them from isolated pariah states into indispensable military suppliers for a great power. Their ability to sustain Russia’s war effort makes them de facto kingmakers in the conflict.

North Korea, in a significant strategic realignment, has made Moscow the priority of its foreign policy. It has reportedly supplied Russia with millions of artillery shells and numerous ballistic missiles, and has even deployed thousands of troops to support Russian operations. In return, Pyongyang is receiving Russian food, fuel, and, most alarmingly, sensitive military technology applicable to its space, nuclear, and missile programs. This exchange directly undermines the international sanctions regime and accelerates the development of North Korea’s own illicit weapons capabilities.

Iran has played a similar role, supplying Russia with thousands of Shahed drones and other military hardware. This cooperation has culminated in the signing of a 20-year Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in January 2025, formalizing a deep alignment in defense, energy, and technology. For Tehran, this partnership provides a powerful patron on the UN Security Council, access to advanced Russian weaponry, and a way to counter U.S. and Israeli pressure in the Middle East. This creates a dangerous feedback loop: Russia’s war effort in Europe is being sustained by, and in turn is technologically enhancing, authoritarian regimes that are actively hostile to U.S. interests and allies in the Middle East and East Asia.

BRICS+: The Vehicle for a Post-Western Order

The BRICS bloc—originally Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—is rapidly evolving from an economic forum into a formidable geopolitical platform for the Global South. Its recent expansion to include major energy producers like Iran and the United Arab Emirates has significantly increased its economic and political weight. The expanded “BRICS+” now accounts for roughly 45% of the world’s population and over 35% of its GDP in purchasing power parity terms.

While the group is internally diverse and often divided—particularly by the strategic rivalry between India and China—it is broadly united in its call for a reform of Western-dominated institutions of global governance, such as the UN Security Council and the Bretton Woods financial system. Regarding the Ukraine war, most members have adopted a position of “pro-Russian neutrality,” refusing to join Western sanctions, abstaining on key UN votes, and often echoing Russian narratives that blame NATO expansion for the conflict. The Alaska summit, by sidelining multilateral institutions in favor of a great-power bargain, would inadvertently bolster the BRICS narrative that the current global order is inequitable and dictated by the unilateral actions of the West, thereby fueling the bloc’s ambitions to create an alternative, multipolar system.

Table 1: Strategic Positions of Key Actors in the Alaska Summit

VI. Institutional Crossroads: The Fates of Global Governance

The Alaska summit represents more than a challenge to specific alliances or national interests; it strikes at the very heart of the post-World War II institutional order. A bilateral deal between the United States and Russia, brokered outside the established frameworks of international law and collective security, would have profound and likely devastating consequences for the key institutions that have structured global governance for nearly eighty years.

The United Nations: The Paralysis of the Permanent Five

The war in Ukraine has already laid bare the inherent paralysis of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) when a permanent, veto-wielding member is the aggressor. Russia has repeatedly and predictably used its veto to block any resolution condemning its own invasion, rendering the UN’s primary body for maintaining international peace and security impotent.

A U.S.-Russia deal struck in Alaska would represent the ultimate circumvention of the UN system. It would signal that the foundational principles of the UN Charter—sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the non-use of force—are not inviolable rights but negotiable commodities in great-power transactions. This would reinforce the cynical view that global security is determined not by international law but by backroom bargains, effectively rendering the UN’s conflict-resolution mechanisms irrelevant in crises involving its most powerful members. While the UN General Assembly has passed multiple resolutions condemning the invasion and upholding Ukraine’s sovereignty, these expressions of the will of the majority of the world’s nations are non-binding. A bilateral deal that contradicts these resolutions would demonstrate that the voices of 140 nations can be overridden by the interests of two.

NATO and the EU: An Existential Crisis

For the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the implications are even more dire. NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept explicitly identifies Russia as the “most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area”. A deal that rewards Russian aggression with territorial gains and a sphere of influence would directly contradict the alliance’s foundational purpose and strategic assessment.

The summit’s entire premise—a transactional, bilateral negotiation—is anathema to NATO’s model of collective security and consensus-based decision-making. As argued previously, it risks a catastrophic loss of credibility and cohesion, particularly among Eastern European allies who would see it as a sign that their security is contingent on Washington’s shifting geopolitical priorities. Similarly, the European Union’s unified strategy has been to combine robust support for Ukraine with escalating sanctions pressure on Russia. A sudden U.S. pivot would leave the EU strategically exposed, undermining its foreign policy and forcing it to accelerate its own defense integration, possibly in a direction that diverges from or even conflicts with U.S. strategic interests.

BRICS: A Moment of Opportunity or Division?

For the expanding BRICS bloc, a U.S.-Russia deal that weakens the Western alliance would be viewed as a major strategic victory. It would validate the core narrative, promoted heavily by China and Russia, that the unipolar moment is over and a multipolar world order is emerging. The image of the U.S. president negotiating directly with the Russian president, while sidelining European allies and the UN, would be presented as definitive proof that the Western-led order is fracturing and that alternative power centers are now setting the global agenda.

However, such an outcome could also expose and exacerbate deep fissures within the bloc itself. India, in particular, has built its foreign policy on maintaining a delicate balance of power. A deal that dramatically empowers a U.S.-Russia condominium or, conversely, leaves Russia so weakened that it becomes a complete vassal of China, would be deeply unsettling for New Delhi’s strategic calculus. While BRICS may celebrate the perceived decline of Western hegemony, the specific contours of the new order forged in Alaska could create new tensions and rivalries within the very group that purports to represent the alternative.

VII. Probabilities and Pathways: Scenarios for Success and Failure

An objective analysis of the Alaska summit requires a clear-eyed assessment of the probabilities of its various potential outcomes. This necessitates defining “success” and “failure” not from a normative standpoint, but from the strategic perspectives of the key actors involved. The irreconcilable nature of their core objectives suggests that a mutually satisfactory outcome is highly improbable, making the summit a high-risk, low-reward venture with a significant chance of collapse or, worse, a deceptive and unstable pause in hostilities.

Defining Success and Failure

• For the United States (Trump’s perspective): Success would be a publicly announced “deal” that freezes the conflict, allowing him to claim a major foreign policy victory as a peacemaker and dealmaker. The ideal outcome would also create the appearance of new distance between Moscow and Beijing, regardless of the underlying reality.
• For Russia (Putin’s perspective): Success is an agreement that codifies its military gains on the ground, guarantees Ukraine’s permanent neutrality and non-accession to NATO, leads to the eventual lifting of sanctions, and fractures the unity of the Western alliance.
• For Ukraine and its European Allies: Failure is defined as any outcome that rewards Russian aggression, compromises Ukrainian sovereignty or territorial integrity, or damages the credibility and cohesion of the transatlantic alliance. A “successful” deal between Trump and Putin would, by this definition, constitute a catastrophic failure for the West.

Scenario 1: The Grand Bargain (Probability: Very Low, <10%)

This scenario represents the full realization of the “Reverse Nixon” fantasy. In this outcome, Russia agrees to substantively downgrade or sever its strategic military and technological partnership with China in exchange for sweeping U.S. concessions on Ukraine and the lifting of major sanctions.

This pathway is exceedingly improbable. As detailed throughout this report, Russia’s economic, military, and ideological alignment with China is too deep, and its structural distrust of the United States is too profound, to be reversed by a single diplomatic overture. Having alienated the West, Moscow has no viable strategic alternative to Beijing. Accepting such a deal would be tantamount to strategic suicide, leaving Russia isolated and vulnerable to both Western pressure and Chinese influence.

Scenario 2: The Transactional Pause (Probability: Medium, ~40-50%)

This is a more plausible, and more dangerous, outcome. The summit produces a limited and ambiguous agreement, such as a temporary ceasefire along the current lines of contact, a vague “land for peace” framework for future negotiations, or simply an agreement to restart dialogue.

This scenario allows both leaders to claim a public victory. President Trump can declare that he “stopped the killing” and brought the parties to the table, fulfilling his campaign promise. President Putin, however, would achieve a major strategic objective. A ceasefire that freezes the conflict in place allows Russia to consolidate its territorial gains, rebuild its battered forces, address its economic challenges, and patiently wait for Western unity and resolve to inevitably fray. This is a classic Russian “play for time” strategy, one that cedes the initiative to Moscow. For Ukraine, this would be a catastrophic outcome, locking in the loss of territory and population under the guise of peace. For the West, it would represent a slow-motion strategic defeat.

Scenario 3: The Acrimonious Collapse (Probability: High, ~50-60%)

This is arguably the most probable outcome. The summit fails to produce any substantive agreement due to the fundamentally irreconcilable positions of the two sides. President Putin, believing Russia’s military position is strengthening, will refuse to make meaningful concessions on his maximalist goals of Ukrainian subjugation and demilitarization. President Trump, unwilling to appear weak or to have been played by his Russian counterpart, could walk away from the talks. Trump himself has publicly pegged the odds of failure at 25%, a figure that is likely a politically optimistic understatement.

A public collapse of the talks would have immediate consequences. It could lead to an escalation of U.S. pressure, including more stringent secondary sanctions and the provision of more advanced, longer-range weaponry to Ukraine. Most significantly, as previously analyzed, a failed U.S. attempt to woo Moscow would drive Russia and China even closer together, validating their shared threat perception and cementing the very axis the summit was designed to break.

VIII. Conclusion: The Illusion of Peace in an Age of Rivalry

The proposed Trump-Putin summit in Alaska, regardless of its specific outcome, is a powerful symptom of a new, more volatile, and unapologetically transactional era of great-power competition. It represents a departure from the post-Cold War consensus on collective security and international law, favoring instead a realist calculus where the interests of great powers supersede the sovereignty of smaller nations. The pursuit of a “deal” at any cost, particularly one that sacrifices the foundational principles that have underpinned global stability, cannot lead to a durable or just peace. Instead, it is likely to produce an illusory and temporary pause in hostilities that serves only to validate aggression, shatter crucial alliances, and accelerate the fragmentation of the global order.

The central strategic premise of the summit—the “Reverse Nixon” gambit to checkmate China by courting Russia—is an exercise in geopolitical fantasy. It is based on a flawed historical analogy that ignores the deep structural forces—economic, military, and ideological—that bind the two authoritarian powers in a durable entente. Their partnership is not a fleeting axis of convenience but a strategic alignment born of a shared desire to overturn a U.S.-led international system they both view as hostile to their core interests. An attempt to fracture this partnership through transactional diplomacy is not only destined to fail but is likely to be counterproductive, ultimately strengthening the Sino-Russian axis by reinforcing their shared threat perception of the United States.

The ultimate legacy of the Alaska summit may not be peace, but a stark clarification of the battle lines in the 21st century’s “New Great Game.” This is a contest fought not just for territory or resources, but for the very principles that will govern the future world order. It is a struggle between a vision of a world governed by international law, sovereign equality, and multilateral cooperation, and one defined by spheres of influence, raw power politics, and the right of the strong to dictate the fate of the weak. By attempting to trade the sovereignty of an ally for a perceived advantage in a great-power rivalry, the Alaska gambit risks choosing the latter, with profound and dangerous consequences for global stability for decades to come.

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