By Adrien Fontanellaz & Kagusthan Ariaratnam

One key contributor to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam’s (LTTE) effectiveness was the organization’s initial focus on gathering, analyzing, and exploiting intelligence. This dedication led to the development of an intelligence apparatus rivaling established state services.

The LTTE formally established its intelligence wing in 1986, known as the National Intelligence Service (Thesiya Pulanaivu Pitivu), by integrating a pre-existing intelligence cell called BETA-2. This new service comprised a small core of activists who had previously received training on Indian soil from instructors affiliated with the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). Against political and military alliances typical of Cold War proxies, New Delhi backed the Sri Lankan Tamil independence movement to exert pressure on Colombo. Pottu Amman (also known as Shanmugalingam Shivashankar), an early activist and a close confidant of Velupillai Prabhakaran, the leader of the movement, was appointed as the head of the new entity and remained in this role until May 2009. RAW was not the sole entity observing the nascent National Intelligence Service, as a small group of Tamil activists also underwent training in Israel in the 1980s under the guidance of Mossad agents. Subsequently, a few years later, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) imparted expertise and training manuals to Sri Lankan insurgents.

Barely trained by its initial cadres, the fledgling Tamil service managed to capitalize on a temporary alliance between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government in 1989. This alliance aimed to facilitate the withdrawal of the Indian Peacekeeping Force from Sri Lankan territory. The groundwork for a network of informants, cells, and caches in the capital and the country’s main cities was established during this period. This clandestine infrastructure would prove pivotal in the subsequent decades, not only for gathering intelligence but also for enabling the movement to target locations in the heart of the capital, Colombo, with relative impunity. The survival of these networks, typically composed of cells of four to six field agents (Velikkala Muhavarhal), overseen by principal agents (Pirathhana Muhavarhal) who often operated through intermediaries (Idainilaiyaalarkal), relied on strict compartmentalization, with members of the same cell usually unaware of each other. The National Intelligence Service also extended its influence into the Tamil diaspora. Early on, the LTTE’s intelligence activities emulated the Israeli Mossad’s Sayanim system, utilizing non-paid but activatable sympathizers to provide ad hoc assistance when needed, referred to as Kalam and Pulam for Tamils residing in Sri Lanka or the diaspora, respectively.

The National Intelligence Service was organized into five key departments. As early as 1993, Kapil Amman oversaw the Intelligence Collection Department, which managed HUMINT (intelligence gathered from human sources, such as informants or agents). This department also held responsibility for intelligence networks, agent recruitment, and operations. This department had five distinct entities, including those focused on internal security and counterintelligence activities.

The Research and Publications Department, led by Mathavan Master, analyzed the data obtained through HUMINT. It used its databases, libraries, and documentary resources to support intelligence production, including daily situation reports, weekly summaries, and detailed monthly reports.

Another department within the National Intelligence Service was dedicated to training and deploying technologies relevant to the service’s activities. Additionally, the Administration and Records section handled administrative and logistical functions.

The National Intelligence Service had up to 1,500 Kalam and Pulam personnel.

Operation Wedding

The Special Operations Division of the National Intelligence Service, the Ellalan Padai, gained notoriety for its involvement in clandestine activities. This division carried out covert operations such as targeted assassinations, sabotage, and terrorist attacks while also conducting psychological warfare projects and propaganda, known as PSY-OPS. The Ellalan Padai comprised a highly secretive unit of Black Tigers or a suicide squad. The initial significant assassination perpetrated by the LTTE, named Operation Wedding, involved the precise use of this modus operandi.

In the early months of 1991, Rajiv Gandhi, the former Prime Minister of India and the key figure behind New Delhi’s direct engagement in Sri Lanka from 1987 to 1990, appeared to be on the verge of a significant political comeback, as electoral polls indicated the Congress Party’s potential victory. Concerned about the possibility of renewed Indian intervention in Sri Lanka if Gandhi were to be re-elected, Velupillai Prabhakaran and Pottu Amman decided to eliminate the Indian leader. To carry out this plan, a small, independent team of nine operatives, led by Sivarasan (also known as Chandrasekarampillai Packiyachandran), was sent from Jaffna to Tamil Nadu, operating separately from the LTTE’s existing covert networks. Among the operatives were two female suicide bombers recruited from the movement’s women’s division: Dhanu, tasked with carrying out the bombing near the target, and Subha, prepared to take Dhanu’s place if necessary. The operation involved an exceptionally sophisticated explosive belt designed by Tiger artificers, incorporating a dual activation mechanism: an initial button to arm the device and a secondary one to trigger the explosion. The belt contained 500 grams of RDX and ten thousand 0.2mm balls weighing 500 grams, making it reliable, lethal, and compact. The use of a female operative further reduced the risk of detection.

On the 7th of May, 1991, the organization rehearsed at an election rally hosted by the then Prime Minister C. S. Singh to simulate the chosen modus operandi. Dhanu successfully positioned herself near the target without arousing suspicion by feigning to present the Prime Minister with a garland of flowers before kneeling at her feet—this was the moment she activated the explosive device. The attack occurred on the 21st of May, 1991, during a similar gathering, this time in support of Rajiv Gandhi. The operation unfolded as planned. Apart from the former prime minister and the suicide bomber, the explosion claimed the lives of 16 others, including another group member who had ventured too close in an attempt to photograph the attack for documentation with the leaders of the movement. This error proved critical as the Indian police discovered the camera and the film it contained, expediting the subsequent investigation into the attack. Over the following weeks, the organization was not only incapacitated, but the case extended into the LTTE’s networks in Tamil Nadu, establishing the Indian state as one of its primary rear bases [1]. While the National Intelligence Service proved effective, the Tigers primarily found themselves facing an implacable enemy that would play a pivotal role behind the scenes in their eradication almost two decades later.

In the interim, suicide bombings continued to be a hallmark of the Ellalan Padai, resulting in the targeting of numerous high-ranking officials, politicians, and opponents of the movement by the Black Tigers. This included an attack on then-President Ranasinghe Premadasa. This operation serves as a stark example of the destructive impact that can arise from the fusion of professionalism and fanaticism. The National Intelligence Service orchestrated the attack by infiltrating Babu, also known as Kumarakulasingham Veerakumar, a young man closely associated with the presidential entourage. Babu operated under the guise of managing a modest grocery store near the Presidential Palace. Over more than a year, Babu succeeded in building relationships with both the president’s guards and relatives, ultimately facilitating his proximity to the target when he executed the attack during the Mayday parade on May 1st, 1993. Many suicide attacks, including the use of vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED) [2], resulted in even greater devastation, at times targeting hard military [3] or soft civilian entities [4].

Spy Tigers

In July 1991, the LTTE, which had established its first semi-regular unit named Charles Anthony Padai Ani [5], initiated a significant assault on the Elephant Pass army camp. Contrary to their anticipated victory, the operation led to a protracted battle, with the Tigers attempting to overcome the garrison’s determined defense while impeding the progress of the reinforcements sent by the Sri Lankan forces. Eventually, they were compelled to withdraw after losing one-fifth of the 3,000 combatants involved – approximately half of the movement’s total strength. This decisive setback prompted a thorough review process [6], revealing a marked deficiency in tactical intelligence. Anticipating the enemy’s strategy before launching an attack became a paramount concern for the Tigers, leading them to spend months surveying enemy positions before their assaults. Thinesh Master and Sasikumar Master, two close military advisors of Velupillai Prabhakaran, subsequently established a specialized unit dedicated to long-range reconnaissance missions, known as the Viseda Vevu Pitivu (special reconnaissance unit), shortly after the battle, assigning duties akin to those of the 13th French RDP or the American SEALs. Subsequently, the organization implemented a training program to educate the combatants involved in this mission [7].

The specialists, known as Spy Tigers, were responsible for the significant success of the LTTE’s shadow fighters. In 1992, the National Intelligence Service gained access through radio monitoring and a well-placed mole to the detailed program of an inspection tour led by Major General Denzil Kobbekaduwa and his close assistants on Kayts Island. A group of Spy Tigers was dispatched to the scene and buried indigenously designed and developed anti-tank mines under the only access road to Araly Point, one of the locations included in the Sri Lankan general’s tour. On August 8th, 1992, he and several other officers were killed when his Land Rover hit one of the mines laid by Spy Tiger operatives, dealing a significant blow to the Sri Lankan war efforts in the north of the country, as Denzil Kobbekaduwa was its linchpin. The Spy Tigers continued to play a critical role after that. Notably, this unit led the infamous reconnaissance mission before the attack on Anuradhapura Airbase, code-named Operation Ellalan, by Black Tiger commandos on October 22nd, 2007.

Military Intelligence

In 1992, under the leadership of Thinesh Master, the LTTE established a second intelligence body known as the Military Intelligence Service (Iranuva Pulanaivu Pitivu). This new branch was responsible for overseeing three intelligence-gathering departments dedicated to the Sri Lankan Army, Navy, and Air Force, as well as a fourth department focusing on administrative and logistics tasks. The Military Intelligence Service employed various methods to gather information, including using undercover agents, SIGINT, Spy Tigers (HUMINT), and the exploitation of Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT). Through these varied approaches, the service was able to acquire comprehensive knowledge of the Sri Lankan armed forces, including details such as the identities of company, platoon, and section-level commanders in specific army units, as well as detailed reconstructions of navy ships, air force fighter planes, and helicopter gunships. High-ranking Sri Lankan security forces officers were subject to close surveillance to ascertain their residence, lifestyle, and travel patterns. This approach allowed the Military Intelligence Service to submit a file on Rear Admiral Clancy Fernando to the National Intelligence Service following the decision to assassinate him. The information in this submission facilitated the task of the Ellalan Padai assassins. The presence of a second intelligence service provided the LTTE with the advantage of cross-checking and verifying both raw data and assessments.

The two intelligence services invariably incited rivalries despite the National Intelligence Service maintaining a primus inter pares position. The “military” spies could criticize the numerous assassinations and attacks carried out by their “civilian” counterparts, perceiving them as counterproductive and damaging to the movement’s reputation. These tensions did not hinder the two branches from collaborating closely, including utilizing a shared training center.

The Intelligence Training Centre (Pulanaaivu Payitchi Maiyam), colloquially called “Base 22,” was located in Kalviyankadu on the Jaffna Peninsula during the mid-1990s. Resembling much of the LTTE’s infrastructure, the camp consisted of scattered residences and huts that blended with the neighboring villages. Approximately 30 officers from both departments participated in simultaneous training. Each individual was accommodated separately in distinct huts to maintain compartmentalization, with permission to remove their hoods only when necessary. To uphold operational and personal security, the student spies were strictly prohibited from interacting with each other and were identified by a number. The rigorous training aimed to equip them with the essential tradecraft and skills required to operate as senior agents, utilizing textbooks from Mossad, RAW, and ISI that had been translated into Tamil. Specific sessions were delivered by the leaders of the services themselves, such as Thinesh Master and Pottu Amman. Additionally, ideological indoctrination was occasionally provided by members of the LTTE’s political bureau, including Anton Balasingham and Velupillai Balakumar. The curriculum also included training in interrogation techniques, which the trainees subsequently practiced with enemy prisoners under the supervision of their instructors. Once their training was completed, the spy candidates had to pass a written exam before graduating.

Flaws

The intelligence and clandestine operations infrastructure provided the organization with disproportionate power, enabling it to enforce a state of siege, systematically eliminate Tamil politicians and public figures critical of the LTTE, and influence Sri Lankan politics. This influence was particularly evident in 1994, when a hardline candidate against the movement was assassinated, paving the way for the victory of Chandrika Kumaratunga, who advocated negotiations with the LTTE. In all its forms, intelligence was considered a crucial component in the LTTE’s operations and tactics, often underpinning their most significant successes and compensating for their numerical inferiority. The coordination among Sri Lanka’s various intelligence and security services facilitated the activities of the National Intelligence Service and the Military Intelligence Service for an extended period.

Following the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, India’s RAW undertook a clandestine effort to undermine the LTTE, aiming to seize control of the organization in collaboration with its second-in-command, Mathaya (also known as Gopalaswamy Mahendrarajah). While Mathaya endeavored to establish an independent power hub within the LTTE, RAW inserted its own operatives into areas controlled by the insurgents. Their objective was to gather extensive intelligence and make preparations for the potential assassination of Velupillai Prabhakaran, with the intent for Mathaya to assume leadership thereafter, effectively bringing the LTTE under New Delhi’s control. However, the Indian agents erred by leaving an LTTE member detained in Tamil Nadu, who was coerced by RAW to infiltrate the LTTE from Colombo, thereby arousing suspicion from the National Intelligence Service’s counterintelligence unit in northern Sri Lanka. Subsequently, the movement’s SIGINT teams intercepted a radio communication from Mathaya to RAW, in which he shared details about the MV Ahat, a cargo ship chartered by the Tigers. This ultimately led to its interception by the Indian navy in the ensuing days.

Mathaya’s subsequent arrest on March 31st, 1993, marked the commencement of a year-long investigation during which numerous Tiger cadres, including prominent commanders such as Balraj and Theepan, were interrogated. Following the conclusion of the inquiry, the Tigers’ counterintelligence determined that close to 600 militants had participated in the conspiracy, resulting in the execution of 257 individuals.

Another devastating blow hit the movement ten years later. The fierce rivalry between Pottu Amman and Karuna Amman (Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan) was a major contributing factor. The latter was a prominent figure in the movement, commanding the Batticaloa and Ampara districts. These districts, relatively isolated from the LTTE strongholds in the country’s north, operated quasi-autonomously. Over time, the forces there gained a reputation of becoming an “LTTE within the LTTE.” Fearing for his life, Karuna Amman defected from the movement’s leadership in 2004. Although the LTTE swiftly suppressed the secessionists by deploying troops to the east, the defection of Karuna Amman and his close associates provided the Sri Lankan authorities with comprehensive knowledge of the Tigers’ operations and organization. These defectors played a significant role in dismantling the LTTE between 2006 and 2009. The National Intelligence Service failed to pre-empt this deadly threat, resulting in disastrous consequences.

Against this backdrop, the intelligence apparatus of the LTTE provides a particularly notable example of the risk involved in disseminating knowledge specific to clandestine activities. Simultaneously, countering this dissemination proves impossible when faced with a sufficiently organized and determined organization, as much of the necessary expertise is widely available from open sources. It is worth noting that, in the case of the Tigers, the transfer of knowledge by foreign intelligence agencies significantly accelerated the process of enhancing the competence of the movement’s spies. Notably, the Tiger intelligence wing acted as a catalyst in the rise of the LTTE as a learning organization. A similar occurrence had to be repeated a few years after the demise of the LTTE when the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) was able to swiftly establish an effective intelligence service, the Emni, thanks to the presence of veterans of the security organs of the former Iraqi Baathist regime.

Featured image: The LTTE Black Tiger suicide commandos conducted the raid on Anuradhapura Air Force Base, code-named Operation Ellaalan, on 22 October 2007 (@Eelam Archives)

Notes

[1] Resulting in a wave of the suicide of Tigers who swallowed their cyanide capsule to avoid capture.

[2] Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices

[3] For example, the attack on the Joint Operations Command (JOC) of the Sri Lankan Armed Forces in Colombo on 21 June 1991

[4] Attack on the World Trade Center in Colombo on October 15, 1997

[5] Literally “force unit” or the equivalent of a large regiment, but whose companies were used autonomously

[6] That would lead, among other things, to the creation of the Sea Tigers

[7] The LTTE used British terminology, defining them as Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols: LRRP

This article was initially published in French by the Défense et Sécurité Internationale (DSI) magazine in its November-December 2020 Issue.