Over the past few years, Myanmar’s navy has tried to break out of its traditional mould as a coastal force reliant on patrol craft and small surface combatants. In pursuit of greater credibility, Naypyidaw has taken its first steps into the undersea domain. Submarines are potent symbols of naval maturity, but for Myanmar, the path has revealed as many constraints as capabilities.
China Steps In
On 24 December 2021, Myanmar commissioned the UMS Minye Kyaw Htin, a Chinese-built Ming-class Type 035B submarine, in a ceremony at the Naval Wharf in Yangon. The date was symbolic, coinciding with the 74th anniversary of the Myanmar Navy. Beijing presented the submarine as a gesture of strategic camaraderie, marking the opening of a new chapter in Myanmar’s maritime ambitions.
Yet, rather than signalling a dramatic leap in sea-denial or deterrence, the induction has exposed the harsh realities of transitioning from a green-water navy to one aspiring for greater reach. The Ming-class remains a legacy platform that underscores Myanmar’s dependence on Chinese hand-me-downs.
Legacy Designs, Limited Returns
The Type 035 lineage stretches back to early Cold War designs derived from Soviet-era Romeo-class boats. When China developed the Ming in the 1970s, it was already considered dated. By the 2010s, the People’s Liberation Army Navy had retired most of its Ming-class units in favour of the far more advanced Yuan-class and Song-class submarines.
Myanmar’s unit displaces about 2,100 tonnes submerged, stretches 76 metres in length, and carries six torpedo tubes. On paper, this provides a respectable entry into undersea operations. In practice, the platform is noisy, lacks advanced sonar, and relies on older wire-guided torpedoes. Analysts at Jane’s Defence note that such boats are best suited for training crews and conducting basic patrols, rather than serving as frontline deterrent assets.
Operational endurance also lags behind modern contemporaries. With a maximum diving depth of around 300 metres and limited submerged endurance, the Ming cannot match the sustained patrols of Russian, European, or even newer Chinese submarines. Its tactical relevance in high-threat waters remains questionable.
Maintenance and Dependence
Equally limiting is the question of sustainment. Chinese defence exports often come with strings attached: Beijing typically provides platforms without meaningful transfer of technical expertise. This ensures continued dependency for spares, repairs, and upgrades. For Myanmar, this means that the Minye Kyaw Htin’s operational availability is tied to Chinese support—a precarious position, given the geopolitical leverage it hands to Beijing.
Reports, including those from the US Congressional Research Service, suggest that such dynamics often translate into low patrol rates, high downtime, and limited autonomy for the recipient navy. In Myanmar’s case, without in-country technical depth, the submarine risks spending more time pier-side than at sea.
The Indian Contrast
A striking comparison lies in Myanmar’s other submarine—the UMS Minye Theinkhathu. Formerly the INS Sindhuvir of the Indian Navy, it was transferred in October 2020 after a comprehensive refit at Hindustan Shipyard Limited. The vessel belongs to the Soviet-designed Kilo-class (Project 877EKM), a globally respected series known for quieting, endurance, and combat credibility.
Unlike the Ming, the Kilo offers Myanmar a genuine combat-capable platform. With a surfaced range of 6,000 nautical miles, the ability to remain submerged for over a week, and a patrol endurance of up to 45 days, it vastly outmatches the endurance of the Ming. The Kilo also carries more advanced weaponry, modern sonar, and benefits from upgrades fitted during its Indian refit.
The contrast is stark. Where the Chinese-built submarine represents dated technology with limited battlefield relevance, the Indian transfer provided Myanmar with a robust, proven design still considered a credible threat in many navies.
Symbolism vs Substance
The juxtaposition of these two boats—one Chinese, one Indian—highlights a deeper reality about Myanmar’s naval modernisation. Beijing’s contribution reflects symbolic diplomacy: providing platforms that look impressive on parade but are of limited operational use. India’s contribution, on the other hand, reflects an approach of capability-building, even if the Kilo-class itself is not cutting-edge by global standards.
For Myanmar, both vessels play more of a training and prestige role than a true combat function. Neither boat will turn the Myanmar Navy into a blue-water force, nor do they radically alter the balance of power in the Bay of Bengal. But they do provide the beginnings of institutional knowledge in submarine operations—something that can be built upon in the future.
Regional Implications
Myanmar’s entry into the submarine club is not an isolated development. Across South and Southeast Asia, smaller navies—from Bangladesh to Vietnam—have been acquiring submarines, often with Chinese or Russian assistance. This reflects a regional trend where undersea platforms are seen as prestige symbols, as well as tools of deterrence in increasingly contested waters.
For India, the presence of Chinese-origin submarines in its near neighbourhood carries strategic implications. While the Ming-class may not pose a serious military threat, it does extend Beijing’s defence footprint in Myanmar. The Indian response—through the provision of the Kilo-class—signals New Delhi’s intent to counterbalance Chinese influence by offering more credible alternatives.
Conclusion
Myanmar’s foray into submarine operations illustrates both ambition and constraint. The Chinese-built Ming-class provides an entry ticket but little more. The Indian-transferred Kilo-class offers real capability but still confines Myanmar to a coastal defence and training role.
For now, Myanmar’s submarines are more about symbolism than deterrence—vessels that look impressive during naval parades but remain limited by age, technology, and dependence on foreign suppliers. In the long run, whether Naypyidaw can evolve beyond this stage will depend less on what Beijing or New Delhi provides, and more on its own ability to develop the technical and industrial base necessary to sustain credible undersea operations.