As India edges closer to theatre commands, one capability gap looms larger than most: rotary power. In the high-tempo land battles of the future, attack helicopters and heavy-lift assets will decide how fast the Army can move men and material, and how effectively it can integrate close air support with ground manoeuvres. Yet these assets remain divided in control and understrength in numbers.
The Attack Helicopter Question
In July 2025, the Army inducted its first three AH-64E Apache attack helicopters, with the rest of its six-strong order to follow. This marks a milestone—until now, India’s 22 Apaches have been with the Air Force, while the Army relied on Rudra and the indigenous LCH Prachand for armed reconnaissance. The induction comes after years of debate: who should control attack helicopters in a theatreised structure?
The Army’s argument is straightforward: attack helicopters are flying artillery, best used in close coordination with armour and infantry. The IAF counters that centralised control prevents fragmentation and ensures efficient use across theatres. Operation Sindoor tilted the debate. In fast-moving engagements, the Army found itself dependent on IAF tasking cycles for close air support. The case for organic Army control of Apaches—with joint tasking mechanisms at theatre HQs—has only grown stronger.
Heavy-Lift: A Thin Fleet
If the attack helicopter debate is about control, the heavy-lift challenge is about sheer numbers. The IAF operates 15 CH-47F(I) Chinooks, invaluable for moving M777 howitzers, bridging equipment, and logistics loads in Ladakh and the Northeast. Their performance in Eastern Ladakh deployments has been critical, but the fleet is too small for large-scale theatre requirements.
India lacks a true heavy-lift replacement pipeline. HAL’s Indian Multi-Role Helicopter (IMRH)—still in development—will be in the 12–13 tonne medium-lift class, not a Chinook equivalent. With ageing Mi-17s due for phased retirement and no confirmed second Chinook tranche, the gap between demand and availability is widening. Without robust heavy-lift, rapid mobilisation—one of theatreisation’s central promises—remains aspirational.
Rotary Power and Theatreisation
Theatre commands are meant to deliver agility: the ability to move formations, guns, and supplies across fronts quickly, while providing commanders with responsive firepower. Rotary assets are central to this. Apaches and Prachands for close air support, Chinooks for heavy lift, IMRHs for medium mobility—all must be placed under joint tasking frameworks where Army and Air Force priorities align, not collide.
The lessons from Sindoor underline this urgency. The Army validated its ability to defend against swarms of drones and missiles. But when it came to rapid offensive punch or shifting artillery across sectors, the thinness of rotary assets was visible. Theatreisation will falter if the helicopter gap remains.
Closing the Gap
Three steps are critical. First, formalise Army operational control over attack helicopters in land battle scenarios, with joint tasking oversight at theatre HQs to satisfy IAF concerns. Second, expand the heavy-lift fleet—whether through a second Chinook tranche or a new heavy-lift program. Third, accelerate IMRH timelines while ensuring it is integrated into joint logistics networks, not siloed service structures.
Rotary power is not a luxury; it is the connective tissue of joint operations. Without enough attack and heavy-lift helicopters, theatreisation risks being a paper reform. With them, it becomes a war-winning transformation.