Defanging the Dragon: India’s Real Antidote to China’s Indian Ocean Strategy

This report provides a strategic analysis of India’s options for neutralizing geopolitical and non-traditional security threats within the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). The primary threat stems from the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) ‘String of Pearls’ strategy, a network of dual-use (commercial and military) ports designed to encircle India, secure Chinese Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs), and project power into India’s traditional sphere of influence.¹

A specific proposal has been advanced: that rebuilding the Adam’s Bridge (Rama Setu) land bridge as a physical causeway connecting India and Sri Lanka could serve as a primary “antidote” to this geopolitical challenge, while simultaneously countering non-traditional threats like terrorism, piracy, and organized crime in the Palk Strait [User Query].

This analysis finds that this proposal is a central paradox. While the bridge presents a theoretically effective tactical barrier against the non-traditional threats endemic to the Palk Strait, it is a geopolitically unviable tool for countering China. Its very nature as an instrument of physical and military control makes it an existential sovereignty threat to Sri Lanka, which has consistently rejected the project.² Pushing for it is counter-productive and risks driving Colombo closer to Beijing.

The report concludes that India’s actual, and more viable, multi-pronged counter-strategy to China lies elsewhere. It is an outward-looking, offensive-denial strategy based on two pillars:

1. The ‘Necklace of Diamonds’: An asymmetric diplomatic and military initiative to secure access to key maritime chokepoints (like Malacca, Hormuz, and Oman) to hold China’s own SLOCs at risk.⁴
2. The ‘Fortress Andaman’ Pivot: A massive, sovereign military buildup on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, transforming them into an “unsinkable aircraft carrier” that acts as a ‘kill-switch’ on the Malacca Strait.⁵

India’s optimal strategy is to formally abandon the politically toxic land bridge proposal and, instead, decouple its security goals: countering China through its viable chokepoint strategy, while addressing Palk Strait crime through a cooperative (not unilateral) security framework with Sri Lanka.

Section 1: The New Great Game: Anatomy of China’s IOR Encirclement

1.1 The ‘String of Pearls’ Doctrine: From Metaphor to Material Reality

The central strategic threat facing India in the IOR is encapsulated by the “String of Pearls” doctrine.¹ This term, first coined by U.S. analysts, describes China’s concerted geopolitical and economic effort, often linked to its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), to establish a network of strategic maritime assets and partnerships across the Indian Ocean.¹

While the Chinese government officially dismisses the term as “malicious defamation” ⁶ and insists its naval strategy is entirely peaceful and focused on protecting regional trade interests ⁶, its actions align with a classic rising-power playbook: expanding military operations to match expanding global economic interests.⁷ This has created a nexus of dual-use ports and facilities that, from New Delhi’s perspective, constitutes a strategic encirclement.

The key “pearls” in this string include:

• Gwadar, Pakistan: A deep-water port that serves as the cornerstone of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), granting Beijing strategic access to the Arabian Sea and a position to threaten India’s western seaboard.¹
• Hambantota, Sri Lanka: A critical deep-water port that China leased for 99 years after Sri Lanka defaulted on its infrastructure loans. This acquisition raised explicit concerns over its potential military use as a People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) logistics hub directly off India’s southern coast.¹
• Chittagong, Bangladesh: A vital maritime location where Chinese investment strengthens its economic ties in South Asia, effectively countering India’s regional dominance in the Bay of Bengal.¹
• Djibouti: China’s first-ever overseas naval base, established in 2016. While officially framed as a logistics hub for anti-piracy, UN peacekeeping, and humanitarian missions, its strategic location at the entrance to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal is unmistakable.¹¹

The “String of Pearls” is not merely a collection of assets but a process. It functions as a predatory geopolitical model that leverages economic inducement (BRI loans) to create economic dependency. This dependency is then converted into strategic access (port leases, as seen in Hambantota) and, ultimately, military presence. The intentional ambiguity, cloaking strategic ambition in commercial language, is a deliberate feature designed to lull littoral states while securing permanent strategic footholds.¹

1.2 The Naval Doctrine: ‘Far Seas Protection’ and Preparing the Battlefield

This physical expansion is backed by a clear doctrinal shift. China’s 2015 defense white paper officially pivoted the PLAN’s mission from “offshore water defense” to “open seas protection”.¹² This “Far Seas Protection” concept is a direct response to China’s extreme dependence on the IOR’s SLOCs for its energy and trade, which it views as a core security vulnerability.¹⁴ This doctrine mandates the PLAN to transform into a global “blue water” navy capable of securing its use of strategic sea lanes and engaging in long-distance security missions.¹³

A critical, and often overlooked, component of this strategy is maritime domain awareness. China has deployed the world’s largest fleet of “dual-use” civilian research vessels to conduct sweeping oceanographic surveys.¹⁶ These ships are meticulously mapping water conditions, currents, and the seafloor, particularly in the Bay of Bengal and near key chokepoints.

This is not benign scientific exploration; it is military “battlespace shaping”.¹⁶ This activity provides the PLA with critical data on the dynamic undersea environment—a “crucial precursor” to confidently and effectively deploying its naval forces, especially its growing submarine fleet.¹⁶ By building a 3D digital model of the IOR’s undersea environment, China is mapping thermal layers, salinity, and seabed topology. This allows its submarines to exploit the environment to hide more effectively while more easily detecting Indian naval assets. This active “preparation of the battlefield” makes any discussion of anti-submarine warfare (ASW) barriers, such as the one proposed in the Palk Strait, highly relevant.

Section 2: India’s Grand Strategic Response: The ‘Necklace of Diamonds’ and the ‘Fortress Andaman’

In response to this multi-domain threat, India has developed a comprehensive counter-strategy. This strategy is not, as the Adam’s Bridge proposal might suggest, a defensive, “fortress-India” approach. Rather, it is an offensive-denial, expeditionary, and multilateral grand strategy designed to counter-encircle China and hold its own assets at risk.

2.1 Countering the Pearls: The ‘Necklace of Diamonds’ Strategy

As a direct countermeasure to the “String of Pearls,” India has initiated its “Necklace of Diamonds” strategy.⁴ This is a counter-encirclement strategy aimed at “garlanding China” by expanding India’s own naval access and strengthening diplomatic and military ties with nations in China’s periphery.⁴

This is not a ‘base-for-base’ race. India’s investment in its “diamonds” is far smaller than China’s BRI spending.¹⁷ Instead, India’s strategy is smarter and more asymmetric, focused on securing access to key chokepoints. The key “diamonds” in this strategy are:

• Chabahar Port, Iran: Provides India with a vital trade route to Afghanistan and Central Asia, strategically bypassing Pakistan and flanking China’s Gwadar port.⁴
• Duqm Port, Oman: A critical logistics agreement gives the Indian Navy repair and refueling facilities, positioning it to monitor the Strait of Hormuz and the Arabian Sea, directly between China’s “pearls” of Gwadar and Djibouti.⁴
• Assumption Island, Seychelles: A planned naval base that, despite political hurdles, is intended to give India a strategic foothold in the Western Indian Ocean to counter China’s growing presence on the East African coast.⁴
• Sabang Port, Indonesia: India has secured military access to this port, which is strategically located at the very entrance of the Malacca Strait—one of the world’s most critical chokepoints and a primary vulnerability for China’s energy security.⁴
• Changi Naval Base, Singapore: A bilateral agreement allows Indian naval ships to refuel and rearm, extending India’s operational reach into the South China Sea.⁴

India is not building a ‘String of Pearls’ of its own. It is building a “Necklace of Diamonds” that acts as a ‘noose’ around the critical maritime chokepoints that China’s “Pearls” are designed to protect. It is a strategy of leverage and interdiction, not presence and acquisition.

2.2 The ‘Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier’: The Andaman & Nicobar (A&N) Pivot

India’s most significant sovereign hard-power response is the massive military and infrastructure buildup on its own Andaman and Nicobar Islands.⁵ This 830-km-long archipelago is a geostrategic dagger, straddling the vital shipping lanes connecting the Indian and Pacific Oceans ⁵ and sitting only 55km from the Chinese-linked military outpost on Myanmar’s Coco Islands.⁵

The Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC), India’s only tri-service joint command ²⁰, is being transformed into a formidable forward operating hub.¹⁹ This multi-billion dollar fortification includes:

• Air Power: Upgrading naval air stations (like INS Utkrosh and INS Baaz) with extended runways to accommodate large maritime patrol aircraft (P-8I Poseidon) and fighter jets.⁵
• Naval Power: Expanding jetties to accommodate larger warships, enhancing logistics, and installing advanced surveillance, including the Integrated Underwater Harbour Defence and Surveillance System.⁵
• Dual-Use Development: The $8.5 billion “Great Nicobar Project” includes a massive transshipment port at Galathea Bay and an international airport, fortifying the Indian presence for both economic and strategic reasons.⁵

By turning the A&N into a fortress (an “unsinkable aircraft carrier”), India is building a “kill-switch.” In a conflict scenario, India does not need to sail its entire fleet to the South China Sea. It can simply interdict all Chinese shipping from the A&N, strangling China’s economy. This is India’s primary maritime counter to China, a strategy of sea denial that is far more significant and viable than any potential project in the Palk Strait.

2.3 Multilateral Levers and Doctrinal Shifts

Recognizing it cannot counter China alone, India has embraced a role as a “net security provider” to the region ¹⁰ and fostered robust multilateral partnerships. The most prominent is the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), comprising India, the United States, Japan, and Australia.²¹

The military manifestation of the Quad is the Malabar naval exercise.²² Once a bilateral drill with the U.S., it now permanently includes Japan and Australia.²² These exercises have grown in complexity to include advanced anti-submarine warfare (ASW) drills, carrier battle group operations, and information domain warfare ²³, demonstrating a high level of interoperability to ensure a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP).²³

This is paired with an internal doctrinal shift. India’s Chief of Defence Staff has signaled a pivot from a “sea control” strategy (requiring expensive aircraft carriers) to a “sea denial” strategy (prioritizing submarines).¹⁵ This is a more pragmatic and asymmetric approach to counter a larger Chinese fleet.¹⁵

This context demonstrates that the Adam’s Bridge proposal is a tactical distraction from India’s strategic depth. The proposal represents a fixed, defensive barrier in a shallow, secondary strait. India’s actual strategy is the exact opposite: it is offensive, mobile, and focused on the primary chokepoints of the deep ocean.⁴ The bridge proposal represents a “fortress” or “Maginot Line” mindset, which is antithetical to India’s modern, expeditionary naval doctrine.

Table 1: China’s “String of Pearls” vs. India’s “Necklace of Diamonds”

Section 3: The Palk Strait: A Microcosm of Maritime Insecurity

To evaluate the Adam’s Bridge proposal, it is essential to first pivot from the “high-geopolitics” of the Sino-Indian rivalry to the “low-intensity” but persistent criminal threats in the Palk Strait. This region presents a unique security challenge that directly relates to the secondary part of the strategic query.

3.1 A Geographically Cursed Frontier

The Palk Strait is a narrow, shallow body of water separating India’s state of Tamil Nadu and the Northern Province of Sri Lanka, only 22 miles at its closest point.²⁷ Its defining feature is Adam’s Bridge (Rama Setu), a 30-mile (48 km) chain of natural limestone shoals, sandbanks, and patch reefs.²⁹

The water here is exceptionally shallow, often less than 4 feet (1 meter) deep, and rarely exceeding 10 meters.²⁹ This unique geography creates two critical, contradictory security conditions:

1. Non-Navigable for Large Ships: It is impossible for large ships, including naval warships, to pass through, seriously hindering navigation.²⁸
2. Highly Porous for Small Craft: The myriad islets, shoals, and shallow waters create a complex, “semi-enclosed” ³³ environment that is easily exploited by small, fast-moving fishing boats and smuggling craft.

3.2 The ‘Non-Traditional’ Threat Matrix

This porous geography is not a hypothetical problem; it is an active corridor for transnational organized crime.³⁴ These non-traditional security threats are a major concern for both India and Sri Lanka.³⁵ The specific criminal activities include:

• Narcotics Smuggling: The Palk Strait is a primary route for trafficking.³³ This includes “Kerala Ganja” (cannabis) ferried from India’s Tamil Nadu coast to Sri Lanka by fiberglass dinghies (FGDs) ³³, as well as Afghan heroin (via Pakistan) and synthetic drugs like methamphetamine (‘Ice’).³³
• Human Trafficking: The same routes and networks are used for human smuggling.³⁸
• Illicit Arms: The region is also vulnerable to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons.³⁸

These are not separate crimes. The illicit trades are “well-integrated and reinforce one another”.³⁸ The same networks that smuggle drugs also smuggle people and weapons. Crucially, these networks are often “overseen by either terrorist groups or their affiliates”.³⁸ This creates a “Criminal-Terrorist Convergence Zone,” where criminal activity and terrorist logistics are indistinguishable. The infrastructure to smuggle narcotics can be instantly repurposed to smuggle operatives, weapons, or explosives, elevating this from a simple policing problem to a core national security vulnerability.

3.3 The Ghost of the Sea Tigers: A Historical Precedent

This convergence zone was perfected by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a designated terrorist organization.³⁹ The LTTE’s formidable maritime wing, the “Sea Tigers,” was born in the Palk Strait.⁴¹

Leveraging deep historical ties with local smuggling gangs from hubs like Velvettiturai (VVT) ⁴², the LTTE weaponized this geography. They used it to smuggle personnel, supplies, and arms from training camps in India’s Tamil Nadu ⁴¹ and to wage a sophisticated asymmetric war against the Sri Lankan Navy. The Sea Tigers used fast-attack craft, frogmen commando units, improvised naval mines, and even crude submersibles based on “narco-sub” designs to attack naval convoys.⁴¹

This history provides a dangerous template. A critical risk emerges when connecting the threats: a hostile state actor (China), engaged in a ‘two-front’ conflict ⁴⁵, could decide to fund, arm, or activate these existing non-state criminal/terrorist proxies in the Palk Strait.³⁸ The LTTE proved the template for bogging down a modern navy in this region. China has the motive (to open a ‘third front’ and bog India down in its own backyard) and the means. This makes neutralizing the Palk Strait’s criminal networks not just a policing action, but a critical geopolitical imperative to deny China a potent asymmetric warfare option.

Section 4: The Great Palk Debate: A Critical Analysis of Two Flawed Solutions

For decades, two competing mega-projects have been proposed to “solve” the Palk Strait’s unique geography. The user’s proposal, the bridge, must be analyzed in the context of its chief rival, the Sethusamudram Shipping Canal Project (SSCP). Both, however, are fundamentally flawed.

4.1 Part 1: The Sethusamudram Canal (SSCP) — A Security and Ecological Non-Starter

The SSCP is a long-stalled project to dredge a 167-km shipping channel through the Adam’s Bridge shoals.⁴⁶

• The Pro-SSCP Argument (Strategic): The project’s primary champion was the Indian Navy. A deepwater channel would “turbocharge” the navy’s cross-coast deployment capabilities, allowing warships to move from the eastern to western seaboard 16-18 hours faster. This would save approximately 780 km by avoiding the circumnavigation of Sri Lanka.⁵⁰ This was a lesson learned from critical deployment lags during the 1999 Kargil War and Operation Parakram.⁵¹
• The Anti-SSCP Arguments (Security, Economic, Environmental): The project was halted for a myriad of reasons.⁴⁸
  1. Security Threat: The Indian Coast Guard itself warned the project would be “fraught with security risks”.⁵³ Because the canal would be “shallow and narrow,” vessels would have to sail slowly, making them “easy targets” for terrorists ⁵³—a critical concern when the LTTE was active.
  2. Economic Non-Viability: The canal was designed for smaller ships (under 30,000 tonnes).⁴⁸ Most modern cargo ships are far larger.⁴⁸ The minimal time savings would be offset by high pilotage and toll charges, making it economically unviable.⁵⁵ A Supreme Court-appointed committee (the Pachauri Committee) found the project to be of “questionable economic value”.⁵⁶
  3. Environmental Catastrophe: The project requires massive dredging in the Gulf of Mannar, a globally significant marine biosphere reserve.⁵⁷ Environmentalists and scientists warned of irreversible damage to coral reefs, seagrass meadows (feeding grounds for dugongs and turtles), and fisheries, as well as unknown impacts on sedimentation and cyclone patterns.⁶⁰
  4. Religious Opposition: Hindu groups vociferously opposed the dredging of the “Ram Setu,” which they believe to be a sacred, man-made structure from the Ramayana.⁵³

This reveals a fascinating paradox: the project was wanted by the Indian Navy (a blue-water force) for strategic mobility ⁵¹, but opposed by the Indian Coast Guard (a coastal security force) because it created a tactical vulnerability.⁵³ The project aimed to solve a high-intensity war problem (fleet deployment) by creating a low-intensity asymmetric warfare vulnerability (terrorism), ultimately failing both.

4.2 Part 2: The Adam’s Bridge Causeway — A Geopolitical Non-Starter

This section directly addresses the proposal to build a physical bridge or causeway (road/rail) over the shoals.³⁰ This project has been discussed for decades, revived in 2023, with feasibility studies reportedly nearing completion in 2024.²

• The Pro-Bridge Argument (Strategic): From India’s perspective, the bridge is a “strategic military instrument”.⁶⁷ Its primary value is geopolitical: it would easily bring Sri Lanka into India’s sphere of influence and, crucially, allow India to “send its military and reinforcement to Sri Lanka easily in a crisis”.⁶⁷ This is aimed squarely at countering foreign (Chinese) forces trying to gain a foothold.⁶⁷
• The Anti-Bridge Argument (Sri Lankan Sovereignty): The project is a non-starter precisely for the reason India wants it. Sri Lanka has consistently and recently (in 2025) rejected the proposal.² The new Sri Lankan government under President Anura Kumara Dissanayake has stated Sri Lanka is “not ready” for it ³, echoing a 2015 rejection.³

Sri Lanka’s core fears are:

1. Loss of Sovereignty: The bridge is seen as a “geopolitical symbol” of “permanence, dependence, and an implicit ceding of strategic autonomy”.² It would eliminate the natural buffer that has preserved Sri Lanka’s independence for millennia and turn it into a “satrapy of India”.²
2. Internal Security & Destabilization: A land bridge would “significantly lower the cost and difficulty of unauthorized crossings”.² This would facilitate illegal migration from Tamil Nadu, smuggling, and the “spill over” of India’s internal politics, stirring ethnic tensions.²
3. Economic Disparity: Sri Lanka fears its smaller economy would be overwhelmed by India’s, with Indians “overcrowding trade and service sectors”.⁶⁹

This creates a “Geopolitical Catch-22.” The bridge’s strategic utility is its political infeasibility. India cannot use the bridge to counter China in Sri Lanka, because Sri Lanka views the bridge itself as a greater and more immediate threat to its sovereignty than China’s “debt traps.”

Table 2: Strategic Feasibility: Sethusamudram Canal vs. Adam’s Bridge Causeway

Section 5: Re-evaluating the Bridge as a Counter-Crime ‘Physical Barrier’

While the bridge fails as a geopolitical tool, its potential as a counter-crime and anti-terrorism tool—the secondary hypothesis of the query—must be seriously evaluated.

5.1 The ‘Sealing the Strait’ Hypothesis

The current Palk Strait threat environment is defined by its porosity. Smugglers in small, fast boats (FGDs) exploit the shallow waters, shoals, and islets ³³ to traffic narcotics, weapons, and people ³⁸ across thousands of square miles of complex, “unpoliced” sea.³⁶

A physical, permanent causeway or bridge built atop the 30-mile (48 km) Adam’s Bridge shoal system ²⁹ would fundamentally alter this environment. It would act as a physical barrier, a “wall in the sea.” This would convert an area defense problem (a maritime ISR challenge) into a point defense problem (a land border checkpoint challenge).

This is a massive force-multiplier for security agencies. Illicit traffic could no longer make a direct, open-sea dash. It would be channelized, forced to go to the bridge’s land-based terminals (to face customs) or try to pass under its arches, where interdiction is simple. This would, as hypothesized, “defang” the Palk Strait smuggling syndicates by destroying their business model, which relies on an open, un-channelized sea.

5.2 A Formidable Anti-Terrorism and Anti-Submarine Blockade

The bridge’s utility extends to higher-end threats. The LTTE Sea Tigers proved the Palk Strait is a viable infiltration and logistics route for a sophisticated terrorist organization.⁴¹ A physical bridge would serve as a permanent, 24/7 surveillance and interdiction platform. It could be equipped with sensors (radar, optical) and serve as a base for rapid-reaction forces, effectively “sealing” the route against any future Sea Tiger-like resurgence or hostile proxy force.⁴⁰

Furthermore, in the anti-submarine domain, the causeway would be a definitive blockade. While the strait is already impassable for conventional submarines ²⁸, the LTTE developed crude submersibles.⁴¹ A causeway built on the shoals would create a physical barrier. More importantly, it could be weaponized: the bridge’s pillars could be embedded with a fixed, passive sonar array (like an underwater fence), creating a permanent, inescapable ASW tripwire. This would permanently deny any underwater vehicle the ability to transit between the Gulf of Mannar and Palk Bay.

This analysis confirms the secondary hypothesis: a rebuilt Adam’s Bridge would be a uniquely effective “antidote” to the specific threats of smuggling, terrorism, and piracy in the Palk Strait.

However, this reveals the central paradox of the proposal. It is a perfect tactical solution for the Palk Strait that is rendered impossible by its fatal strategic flaw. Its very effectiveness at physical control is what makes it an unacceptable sovereignty threat to Sri Lanka ², rendering it politically impossible.

Section 6: Strategic Synthesis and Recommendations

6.1 The Adam’s Bridge Paradox: A Dual-Use Non-Starter

This report confirms the two primary threats: the geopolitical threat from China’s “String of Pearls” ¹ and the non-traditional threat from criminal/terrorist networks in the Palk Strait.³³ The proposal of a rebuilt Adam’s Bridge as a dual-use “antidote” has been critically evaluated.

• As a Geopolitical (Anti-China) Tool: It is a non-starter. India’s real anti-China strategy is mobile, outward-looking, and based on the A&N Islands ⁵ and the “Necklace of Diamonds”.⁴ The bridge proposal is a strategically flawed “fortress” concept that is explicitly rejected by Sri Lanka as a primary threat to its own sovereignty.² Pushing for it would weaken India’s regional standing, not strengthen it.
• As a Maritime Security (Anti-Crime) Tool: It is theoretically brilliant. This report’s analysis confirms the insight that a physical barrier would decimate smuggling, terrorism, and piracy in the Palk Strait by converting a porous maritime area into a defensible land chokepoint.

The proposal is, therefore, a “Geopolitical Catch-22.” It is a perfect tactical solution for the Palk Strait that is rendered impossible by its strategic implications. Its tactical brilliance is its strategic flaw.

6.2 Recommendations: Decoupling the Strategies for a Viable IOR Policy

India’s strategy must be pragmatic and decoupled. The Palk Strait threat (crime) and the IOR threat (China) cannot be solved with a single, politically toxic project.

Recommendation 1: Formally Abandon the Palk Strait Land Bridge.

India should officially shelve the land bridge proposal. Its pursuit creates friction with Sri Lanka, which is counter-productive and undermines the actual goal of countering Chinese influence. Sri Lanka’s “pragmatic rejection” 2 must be respected.

Recommendation 2: Double Down on the Viable Anti-China Strategy.

India’s full strategic focus and resources must be directed toward its two proven, sovereign-controlled, and effective strategies:

• ‘Fortress Andaman’: Accelerate the military and infrastructure (Great Nicobar Project) buildup on the A&N Islands to cement its ‘Malacca kill-switch’.⁵
• ‘Necklace of Diamonds’: Deepen operational access and interoperability at key chokepoint nodes like Sabang, Duqm, and Chabahar.⁴
• Multilateralism: Continue to invest heavily in Quad/Malabar exercises to build collective security and interoperability against the PLAN.²³

Recommendation 3: Pivot to a Cooperative Palk Strait Security Framework.

The very real threats in the Palk Strait 33 must be addressed, but not with a unilateral mega-project. The alternative is a cooperative security framework with Sri Lanka, which builds trust rather than destroys it. This must include:

• Enhanced Joint Patrols: Increase the frequency and coordination of “Dosti” style India-Sri Lanka Coast Guard exercises.³⁷
• Intelligence Fusion: Create a joint intelligence fusion center for non-traditional threats (drugs, human trafficking).
• Technological Surveillance: Instead of a physical bridge, build a virtual India can fund and share a joint maritime surveillance network (Coastal Radar, ISR drones) for the Palk Strait, giving Sri Lanka the capability to police its own waters without the threat of Indian military dominance.

This cooperative approach aligns with India’s role as a “net security provider” ¹⁰ and is the only viable path to securing its immediate backyard.

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