Since its inception in 1984, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (the Service) has been instrumental in protecting the nation’s security. The Service has collaborated with diverse entities, including academia, to gain insights into security risks and shape policy decisions. The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, popularly known as 9/11, led to a shift in global security priorities, with counterterrorism becoming a top concern. Captures taken from the Internet Archive’s Wayback Machine at three crucial junctures in the Service’s history demonstrate how the site has adjusted to its academic outreach throughout history, particularly emphasizing its transition towards counterterrorism initiatives after the devastating 9/11 incident. As a result, the Service and other intelligence agencies redirected their focus to address this new reality.
The Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act was created in response to the 1981 McDonald Commission report findings. In July of 1984, the Service Act was implemented, establishing a new civilian security intelligence agency. The Service replaced the former Security Service, which had functioned as part of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). The Act granted the Service an explicit statutory charter, defined its mandate, and introduced judicially authorized warrants for intrusive investigative techniques and tradecraft.
Between 1990 and 2005, the Service had a commentary section as a bridge between the service and external experts. The section covered a broad range of topics related to national security and drew insights from various fields, such as academia and business. The program’s primary objectives were to challenge assumptions, promote evidence-based decision-making, and provide a multidisciplinary perspective (CSIS 2018).
It is worth noting that in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the Service’s academic outreach was dramatically reoriented, and the program underwent a significant transformation. While it had previously engaged with a diverse range of experts, the post-9/11 period saw a pronounced shift toward counterterrorism. The agency sought expertise related explicitly to jihadist networks, homegrown extremism, and evolving terrorist tactics.
Douglas Eyman’s article titled “Defining and Locating Digital Rhetoric” delves into the field of digital rhetoric and its relevance to communication practices in the digital era (Eyman 29). While the article primarily focuses on the theoretical and methodological aspects of digital rhetoric (p.93), its implications are significant for the global intelligence community in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Following the terrorist attacks, intelligence agencies faced unprecedented challenges, increasing the need for real-time communication, intelligence sharing, and collaboration.
Digital rhetoric is crucial in how intelligence professionals communicate critical information to decision-makers and the public. Eyman’s concept of “locating” digital rhetoric within existing disciplines aligns with the intelligence community’s efforts to incorporate digital tools seamlessly. As scholars continue to place digital rhetoric within established fields, intelligence professionals strive to integrate digital intelligence practices into existing frameworks. Eyman’s exploration of digital rhetoric aligns with the intelligence community’s ongoing adaptation to the digital era, emphasizing the importance of effective communication, collaboration, and strategic use of technology.
The Service faced the challenge of balancing its traditional multidisciplinary approach with the urgent need to address terrorism. While counterterrorism efforts were crucial, the Service also recognized the importance of broader national security interests. The Service’s academic outreach program shifted its focus to ensure that the agency’s work was informed by a spectrum of Canadian voices and perspectives, especially in counterterrorism (CSIS 2018). The program continued to host workshops, presentations, and round-table discussions.
This essay is divided into three Internet Archive’s Wayback Machine-captured versions of the Service’s website. The following paragraphs analyze how the international intelligence community, including the Service, collaborated to share actionable intelligence against transnational terrorist organizations in the context of the “Global War on Terrorism” following the events of 9/11.
The Service’s Commentary No. 81
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, in the Spring of 2002, the Service commentary section published an article entitled “The Effects of September 11 and Its Aftermath on China: A Chinese Response,” authored by Michael Szonyi. In the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, the global security landscape underwent sudden shifts. While much of the world focused on the immediate aftermath and the U.S. response, China also grappled with the implications of this tragic event. Michael Szonyi’s commentary sheds light on how China perceived and responded to the 9/11 attacks.
China’s initial reaction was a mixture of both sympathy and condemnation. Chinese President Jiang Zemin expressed sympathy for the victims and their families. China swiftly condemned all violent acts of terrorism. Beijing endorsed United Nations Security Council resolutions condemning the attacks and extended support for international security and intelligence cooperation. China also called for global cooperation in combating terrorism. Despite prior tensions, the 9/11 attacks led to warmer relations between the U.S. and China. China’s support for U.S. actions against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban signaled cooperation.
Beijing recognized the need to balance competition and cooperation with the U.S. Economic ties, military modernization, and regional stability became focal points. China faced the challenge of managing its rapid economic growth and military modernization. The U.S. remained a critical partner and competitor. China’s response to 9/11 reflected a delicate balancing act. China also safeguarded its national interests while cooperating with the U.S. on counterterrorism. The events of that fateful day echoed far beyond American shores, shaping China’s strategic calculus in an evolving world order.
The Service’s Commentary No. 83
In July 2003, the Service published Michael Herman’s commentary, entitled “Intelligence After 9/11: A British View of the Effects,” the author provides insights into how the United Kingdom responded to the terrorist attacks of 9/11. The terrorist attacks crystallized the exceptional threat posed by global terrorism. Al-Qaeda’s willingness to die for their cause and their pursuit of radiological, chemical, and biological means of attack heightened the urgency. The U.S. focused on defeating an external enemy, leading to the war on terror.
In Europe, the problem was mirrored internally, with support for jihadist violence found within small minorities in European Muslim communities. The UK developed a unique counterterrorism strategy called “Contest.” The contest aimed at maintaining normality while aggressively countering jihadist terrorism. Its pillars included Pursue (bringing terrorists to justice), Prevent (reducing radicalization), Protect (enhancing security), and Prepare (emergency response).
The British approach emphasized maintaining individual liberties and the rule of law. It sought to reduce the likelihood of attacks while allowing people to go about their everyday lives confidently. In summary, the British response to 9/11 involved a risk reduction strategy that combined intelligence efforts, police cooperation, and a commitment to safeguarding security and civil liberties.
The Service’s Commentary No. 85
Reid Morden’s commentary “Spies, not Soothsayers: Canadian Intelligence After 9/11” was published in the fall of 2003. In it, the author delves into the impact of the 9/11 attacks on Canada’s intelligence community.
The 9/11 attacks exposed vulnerabilities in intelligence agencies worldwide. Canada’s intelligence community faced the daunting task of adapting to a new security paradigm. Morden emphasizes that intelligence agencies are not fortune-tellers; they gather information and analyze threats. The post-9/11 era demanded agility, not prophecy.
Canada’s intelligence agencies shifted their attention toward counterterrorism efforts. The focus was on preventing attacks, understanding extremist networks, and enhancing security. Balancing civil liberties with security imperatives posed difficulties. Intelligence agencies needed skilled personnel with a long-term vision. The 9/11 aftermath underscored the need for robust intelligence capabilities. Agencies must remain vigilant, responsive, and adaptable. Reid Morden’s commentary highlights the transformation of Canadian intelligence post-9/11, emphasizing practical action over prophetic foresight.
In his article “When the Present Web Is Later the Past: Web Historiography, Digital History, and Internet Studies,” Niels Brügger discusses the challenges of writing the history of the web (Brügger 103). The article highlights the significance of archived web material as a historical source as it plays a crucial role in documenting the constantly evolving web for future historians. The article also explores the methodological issues related to reborn digital material in web archives, including its characteristics and implications for historical research (p.109). It sheds light on the complexities of documenting the ever-changing web and its significance in understanding our digital past.
Between 1990 and 2005, the Service transformed significantly by redirecting its commentary section towards an academic outreach focus (CSIS, 2018). During this time, the Service acknowledged the value of collaborating with external experts, stakeholders, and thought leaders to expand its comprehension of national security matters. As a result, the Service created the Academic Outreach and Stakeholder Engagement program, which links the organization and Canadians. The program fosters connections with academics, subject matter experts, and thought leaders nationally and internationally.
The Service aims to incorporate diverse Canadian perspectives. To achieve this, they actively engage with various groups, including non-governmental organizations, industry associations, and civil society (CSIS, 2018). The stakeholder engagement program is designed to build trust and transparency, enhancing the Service’s reputation as a dependable partner in safeguarding Canada’s social fabric and economic prosperity. The Service’s recent emphasis on academic outreach demonstrates its commitment to collaboration, informed analysis, and a collective understanding of Canada’s national security interests.
In its academic outreach, the Service’s historical shift toward counterterrorism reflects the evolving security landscape. While the agency remains committed to engaging with external experts, it recognizes that addressing modern threats requires strategic adaptation. The legacy of 9/11 continues to shape the Service’s approach, emphasizing both vigilance and resilience. The Service’s academic outreach journey—from diverse commentary to targeted counterterrorism focus—underscores the agency’s commitment to protecting Canada’s security while adapting to new challenges.
Featured image: The Globe and Mail
Works Cited
Brügger, Niels. “When the Present Web Is Later the Past: Web Historiography, DigitalHistory, and Internet Studies.” Historical Social Research, vol. 37, no. 4 (142), 2012, pp.102–117. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/41756477. Accessed 13 April 2024.
Canadian Security Intelligence Service. Academic Outreach and Stakeholder Engagement. 26 Apr. 2018, https://www.canada.ca/en/security-intelligence-service/corporate/academic-outreach.html Accessed 13 April 2024.
Commentary No. 81: The Effects of September 11 and Its Aftermath on China, and The Chinese Response. 3 Mar. 2006, (http://csis-scrs.gc.ca/en/publications/commentary/com81.asp.) Internet Archive. (https://web.archive.org/web/20060303062600/http://csis- scrs.gc.ca/en/publications/commentary/com81.asp.) Accessed 1 April 2024.
Commentary No. 83: Intelligence After 9/11: A British View of the Effects. 3 Mar. 2006, (http://csis-scrs.gc.ca/en/publications/commentary/com83.asp.) Internet Archive. (https://web.archive.org/web/20060303062613/http://csis- scrs.gc.ca/en/publications/commentary/com83.asp.) Accessed 1 April 2024
Commentary No. 85: Spies, Not Soothsayers: Canadian Intelligence After 9/11. 3 Mar. 2006, (http://csis-scrs.gc.ca/en/publications/commentary/com85.asp.) Internet Archive. (https://web.archive.org/web/20060303062624/http://csis-scrs.gc.ca/en/publications/commentary/com85.asp.) Accessed 1 April 2024
Eyman, Douglas “Defining and Locating Digital Rhetoric.” Digital Rhetoric: Theory, Method, Practice. University of Michigan Press, 2015, pp. 12–60. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv65swm2.5. Accessed 13 April 2024
APPENDIX i (The Service’s Commentary No. 81)
APPENDIX ii (The Service’s Commentary No. 83)
APPENDIX iii (The Service’s Commentary No. 85)
