The article “To Defeat Hamas, Emulate the Destruction of the Tamil Tigers” by A.J. Caschetta is both provocative and controversial. It draws a striking comparison between Sri Lanka’s military defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and Israel’s current struggle against Hamas. While Caschetta presents a strong case for emulating the Sri Lankan model, the comparison overlooks crucial geopolitical, strategic, and ideological distinctions that make such replication not only impractical but potentially counterproductive in the context of Israel and Gaza.
The strength of Caschetta’s analysis lies in its historical parallels. He highlights how both the LTTE and Hamas transitioned from insurgent groups into quasi-state actors. Each developed formalized military wings, claimed governance over territory, and utilized tactics such as suicide bombings. The LTTE controlled parts of northern Sri Lanka, created administrative structures, and fielded a conventional fighting force. Similarly, Hamas governs Gaza, maintains armed brigades, and presents itself as both a political and militant organization.
Caschetta underscores the success of the Sri Lankan military campaign, which was marked by a no-compromise stance and aggressive escalation. The Sri Lankan government, under President Mahinda Rajapaksa, opted to abandon negotiation efforts and ceasefires, shifting instead to total war. This approach, according to Caschetta, is what ultimately led to the LTTE’s destruction. He supports this argument with historical examples where international mediation and truces failed to bring lasting peace, suggesting that similar diplomatic overtures toward Hamas may be equally ineffective.
However, despite the compelling narrative, the article simplifies complex realities. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict differs drastically from the Sri Lankan civil war in terms of geography, global engagement, and ideological context. Sri Lanka is an island nation. Its geography enabled the military to encircle and isolate LTTE-controlled areas, cutting off escape routes and supply chains. In contrast, Israel is surrounded by multiple nations and operates in a dense geopolitical theater where outside actors—ranging from neighboring Arab states to global powers—routinely intervene.
Moreover, the nature of Hamas’s support networks adds another layer of complexity. Unlike the LTTE, whose backing came largely from the Tamil diaspora and waned significantly after India withdrew its support, Hamas benefits from sustained sponsorship from powerful states such as Iran, Qatar, and Turkey. These alliances ensure that Hamas continues to receive funding, weaponry, and political cover, even under international sanctions.
Ideologically, the two groups are also fundamentally distinct. The LTTE was an ethno-nationalist organization seeking an independent Tamil homeland. Hamas, by contrast, is a religiously driven Islamist movement embedded within the broader Palestinian struggle. Its motivations are tied not only to territorial liberation but to theological and civilizational narratives. This fusion of politics, identity, and religion makes it far harder to dislodge than a separatist movement with purely territorial ambitions.
Another major oversight in the article is its treatment of international law and human rights concerns. While Sri Lanka did face post-conflict scrutiny, particularly over allegations of war crimes, its campaign against the LTTE occurred under comparatively less global visibility. Israel, on the other hand, operates under constant international surveillance. Any attempt to apply Sri Lanka’s model would almost certainly provoke intense backlash, potentially leading to diplomatic isolation, economic sanctions, and criminal proceedings against Israeli officials.
Caschetta’s proposal assumes that decisive military victory alone is sufficient to resolve protracted conflicts. Yet even Sri Lanka’s so-called success came at a high cost—tens of thousands of civilian casualties, mass displacements, and enduring ethnic grievances. The end of the LTTE did not mean the end of Tamil dissent, and reconciliation remains a fraught process more than a decade later.
Furthermore, applying this model to Gaza overlooks the intricacies of urban warfare in a territory densely populated by civilians. The use of overwhelming force could result in catastrophic human costs, triggering not only regional upheaval but a humanitarian crisis of global proportions.
There are indeed strategic parallels between Hamas and the LTTE: both emerged as responses to systemic grievances; both developed state-like attributes and employed violent tactics; and both proved adept at manipulating ceasefires to regroup. But these similarities do not justify transplanting one counterterrorism model onto another conflict with vastly different parameters.
The article ultimately fails to acknowledge that Israel’s constraints are not merely tactical but legal, diplomatic, and moral. The pursuit of security cannot be disentangled from the principles of proportionality, accountability, and long-term political solutions. A singular focus on military annihilation, as exemplified by Sri Lanka, risks deepening cycles of violence rather than ending them.
In conclusion, while Caschetta’s comparison is thought-provoking, it simplifies the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and glosses over vital distinctions. Israel cannot adopt the Sri Lankan approach without incurring significant moral and political costs. The path to peace, however difficult, must involve more than battlefield victories—it requires addressing the roots of conflict, ensuring accountability, and engaging with the international community in good faith.