The Role of Timely and Actionable Military Intelligence in Winning Wars

Military intelligence is crucial for success on the battlefield. Recent global events highlight the importance of swift and accurate intelligence. For example, the meticulously planned attack by Hamas on Israel revealed a shocking intelligence failure as Israel was caught by surprise (Harding). In his insightful analysis, Ted Singer, a senior Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) official with a wealth of experience in the Middle East, draws a parallel between the Israeli intelligence lapse on October 7 and the historic events of 9/11 (Bergman and Goldman). According to him, the failure was a result of a gap in analysis that failed to paint a convincing picture to military and political leadership that Hamas had the intention to launch the attack when it did. Meanwhile, Russia’s ongoing illegal invasion of Ukraine, with no sign of a swift resolution, exemplifies the enduring challenges faced in conflict resolution in the absence of accurate and timely intelligence (Kuzniak 93). Furthermore, the potential invasion of Armenia by Azerbaijan adds to the geopolitical intelligence complexity (International Crisis Group).

In the present era of technology, nations have developed sophisticated methods to subvert their adversaries’ information and intelligence systems. This plays a significant role in obtaining a tactical edge and accomplishing strategic goals in military intelligence. This essay will explore the intricate nature of military intelligence and emphasize its crucial role in achieving conflict success. It will discuss its historical importance, current applications, and prospects. Additionally, the essay will analyze a case study of Sri Lanka’s successful counterterrorism campaign, examining the role of intelligence innovations outside the NATO nations.

John Tidd’s research delves into the historical significance of timely and actionable Intelligence in shaping the outcomes of conflicts, using examples from World War II and the Cold War era to argue that obtaining and acting upon timely information has been a determining factor in military victories (5-24). Analyzing historical cases, one can understand the importance of timely intelligence against evolving threats.

Several scholars have debated the significance of military intelligence in warfare throughout history. Farwell and Arakelian examine the current uses of actionable intelligence in modern combat, building on a solid historical foundation. The article highlights the critical role of actionable intelligence in converting information into effective military operations (71–86). By carefully analyzing recent conflicts in Iraq and Syria, the authors illustrate how actionable intelligence can result in favorable outcomes, providing valuable insights into the evolving nature of military intelligence in the current era.

The role of technology in military intelligence has been significant in increasing the speed and effectiveness of intelligence gathering. In a recent study by Brian Katz (2022), the impact of technology on intelligence gathering was investigated, focusing on integrating artificial intelligence, satellite imagery, and cyber capabilities. The study revealed that these technologies can transform intelligence gathering by providing timely and actionable intelligence. However, the article also points out the challenges of ensuring the security and ethical use of advanced surveillance methods.

Analyst Gregory Elder from the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency wrote “Intelligence in War: It Can Be Decisive,” discussing the importance of accurate, timely, and actionable intelligence in making crucial decisions for force employment schemes. Elder identified five strategic battles where intelligence played a decisive role: the First Battle of Bull Run (1861), Tannenberg (1914), Midway (1942), Incheon (1950), and the Israeli airstrike that started the Six-Day War in 1967. He emphasized that technology and material superiority did not guarantee victory. Instead, the willingness of leaders to prioritize intelligence as a crucial factor in their decision-making process was the key to success.

Intelligence has always been and will continue to be a crucial factor in conflicts, as noted by General Hugh Shelton, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 2000 (Elder 20). The success of modern weapons systems, innovative combat techniques, and new operational concepts, particularly those utilizing faster, more agile, and lethal forces, highly depends on rapid, accurate, and detailed intelligence (Elder 20). Planners, operators, political and military leaders, and members of the Intelligence Community need to recognize this and not underestimate the importance of intelligence, as some authors like John Keegan have suggested. After all, even the strongest boxer cannot defeat an unseen or unstudied foe (Elder 20). 

Accurate, timely, and actionable intelligence is crucial for winning wars. It provides military commanders with the necessary information. Making sound decisions and executing successful strategies is vital to achieving victory on a battlefield. Updated and reliable information about the enemy’s strength, location, and intentions is essential. Intelligence helps the military to identify and prioritize targets, plan operations effectively, and allocate resources efficiently while mitigating risks and minimizing casualties.

The quality and effectiveness of intelligence gathering and analysis can significantly impact the outcome of any conflict. It is important to note that intelligence is critical to a broader strategy, including military capabilities, diplomacy, and public support. Deception, tactics, strategies, and timely and actionable intelligence have all played significant roles in winning wars rather than material superiority. Intelligence dominance over enemies cannot be overstated. According to Sun Tzu, a prominent military strategist from the 5th century BCE, an army without secret agents is akin to a man without the ability to see or hear. Secret operations are critical in warfare, as they inform an army of every move it makes (Minford 26). Sun Tzu also emphasized the importance of deception in The Art of War, asserting that the ultimate goal is to conquer the enemy without engaging in direct combat (Minford 10).

The concept of having timely and actionable intelligence that is crucial for achieving success in wars has been proven through empirical evidence from specific case studies. For instance, the Battle of Midway, considered a significant turning point in World War II, demonstrated how the U.S. Navy utilized timely information on Japanese plans to launch a decisive counterattack (Elder 20). Similarly, General Grant Hammond (7) analyzed Operation Desert Storm and illustrated how actionable intelligence can lead to swift and effective military actions in modern times. In this particular context, the civil war in Sri Lanka presents a clear juxtaposition to the battles waged by well-resourced Western troops in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and, presently, the Israel-Hamas conflict. The question then arises: how did Sri Lanka prevail over what was perceived as the most inventive and formidable insurgent group? The key lies in the intelligence superiority that was exercised over the adversary.

Hence, a case study about a notable intelligence development beyond the Anglosphere is examined in the counterterrorism efforts in Sri Lanka. This South Asian Island nation in the Indian Ocean has experienced political and economic instability due to a prolonged ethnic conflict lasting over three decades. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), also known as the “Tamil Tigers,” regarded as one of the most innovative and formidable insurgent groups globally, engaged in a prolonged struggle against the Sri Lankan government. They aimed to establish a separate homeland for the Tamil ethnic minority in the northern and eastern provinces. The LTTE’s tactics served as a model for terrorist organizations worldwide, with groups such as Hamas, Taliban, Al Qaeda, and even Daesh adopting their methods for acts of terrorism (FBI – Taming the Tamil Tigers).

Following over 20 years of intense conflict and four unsuccessful attempts at peace talks, which even included the deployment of the Indian Peace-Keeping Force from 1987 to 1990, a glimmer of hope emerged with the declaration of a lasting negotiated settlement to the conflict, brokered by Norway, in December 2001. Shortly after that, an international mediation resulted in the signing of a cease-fire agreement in 2002. It is worth noting that despite another unsuccessful attempt at peace talks in 2002, the Sri Lankan military intelligence and special forces meticulously planned and executed innovative intelligence operations. These efforts ultimately led to the defeat of the Tamil Tigers, despite opposition from human rights groups and calls for a negotiated settlement by the United Nations (Bajoria).

This recent military achievement is notable when compared to the struggles faced by well-resourced NATO troops in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria over the past two decades and the current conflict between Israel and Hamas. Past failures to reach agreements with the Tamil Tigers illustrate the unwavering militant ideology of terrorist groups, making negotiations with them unacceptable. Similarly, attempts by the United States-led NATO forces to negotiate with the Taliban are unlikely to succeed, as the Taliban’s ultimate objective is to establish an “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan” rather than a stable and harmonious government in Afghanistan (Vohra). The ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas highlights the urgent need for a humanitarian ceasefire to safeguard innocent Palestinian civilians. However, it is crucial to consider that such a ceasefire could also allow Hamas to reinforce, reorganize, and resume fighting in the future.

According to Dr. Bruce Hoffman, a leading counterterrorism expert, intelligence gathering is crucial to the success of any counterterrorism operation. It must be collected diligently, analyzed meticulously, disseminated quickly, and acted upon effectively. However, Americans often underestimate the challenges and ethical considerations involved in obtaining “good intelligence” despite the experiences of other nations fighting similar enemies (Hoffman). This is particularly relevant for United States-led NATO forces and its allies facing a complex and multifaceted enemy that employs unconventional tactics, including psychological and intelligence warfare (Ball and Richardson).

To effectively combat the Tamil Tigers, the Sri Lankan security forces prioritized strengthening their military intelligence-gathering capabilities. This involved recruiting former Tamil Tiger cadres and other Tamil militants to work with the security forces as “paramilitary” groups. The Sri Lankan Army’s Deep Penetration Unit (DPU) and Special Force Regiment (SF) were instrumental in gathering military intelligence. The Directorate of Military Intelligence of Sri Lanka even orchestrated a “break-away” faction within the Tamil Tigers (Ariaratnam). By infiltrating and analyzing the Tigers’ communication and transmission systems, the military’s signal intelligence convinced thousands of cadres to surrender. Combining the military’s SIGINT (Signal Intelligence) with the HUMINT (Human Intelligence) gathered by former Tamil Tiger cadres proved a successful strategy.

In 2004, the defection of Colonel Karuna, a senior military commander of the Tamil Tigers, dealt a significant blow to the organization. He brought with him around 6,000 Tiger cadres, resulting in the loss of control and influence in significant parts of their support base in Eastern Sri Lanka. The Tamil Tigers also lost a significant source of recruits, which weakened their perceived strength. The Sri Lankan military saw this as an opportunity to make significant territorial gains and potentially achieve victory. Additionally, the mass defection provided valuable intelligence and insights into the Tamil Tigers as a fighting organization. This event also marked the first time that government intelligence agencies had the support of minority Tamils willing to collect real-time intelligence and report back from Tiger-held areas. The Tamil Tigers’ declining legitimacy was highlighted by the scope and scale of the defection, ultimately leading to their defeat (Layton).

To achieve success in modern conflicts, NATO forces led by the United States and its allies must prioritize winning over the general population’s hearts and minds and even within the enemy ranks. This is where American “soft power” can play a critical role. While “hard power” is essential for protecting a nation’s interests, it is crucial to explore non-military strategies when facing an enemy with many different faces. Sun Tzu famously said that the supreme art of war is conquering the enemy without fighting (Minford 10). This involves breaking the will to fight and destroying the enemy’s spirit, which is crucial for ultimate victory.

General Hammond presented critical findings on lessons learned and how future wars should be fought following the Persian Gulf War:

War is apt to defy its traditional image in the future. Suppose the end of past wars was to win by fighting better than one’s adversary […] This is not simply a choice between conventional and unconventional images of war. We must reinvent warfare by redefining its nature. Armed conflict, as it has been known, is beyond the capacity of most nations today. Military victory no longer enjoys the cachet that it once bore. By understanding the paradoxes of war, we will help ensure the Armed Forces’ future success. (2)

Even after almost 30 years since Hammond’s reporting, his message on how to fight future wars remains relevant. The approach must be based on mental preparation and a commitment to follow Sun Tzu’s ancient advice, which should be considered a new guiding principle for the American-led NATO forces. Sun Tzu says, “Winning without fighting is the highest form of excellence” (Minford 10). That is, under the U.S. military’s counterinsurgency doctrine, it is crucial to demoralize the enemy and break their will to fight by winning their hearts and minds. This may be the only way for us to stay competitive in the future.

The role of timely and actionable military intelligence in winning a war is complex and constantly evolving. In today’s world, countries use tactics to undermine their opponents’ information systems, leading to the rise of intelligence and information warfare. The three peer-reviewed articles I have analyzed provide historical context, contemporary applications, and future considerations related to this critical aspect of warfare. By synthesizing insights from these articles, I stress the importance of military strategists prioritizing timely and actionable intelligence. Scholars have classified conflicts in the Middle East between Israel and Hamas, in Eastern Europe between Russia and Ukraine, and Eurasia between Azerbaijan and Armenia as instances of information warfare. As Joseph Nye (5) emphasized, in the information age, winning a war is not only about whose army emerges victorious but also about whose story gains prominence. To succeed, a strong intelligence-led counter-narrative is essential, as evidenced by the case in Sri Lanka. This can only be achieved when nations employ more aggressive and precise intelligence-gathering tactics and utilize a unified and integrated military and defense intelligence analysis approach. Such an approach may provide the necessary advantage to emerge as the ultimate winner.

Featured image: SOFREP

Works Cited

Ariaratnam, Kagusthan. Intelligence Innovation Outside the Anglosphere: Deconstructing the Sri Lankan Counterterrorism Model for Obliterating ISIS. 27 Jan. 2017, projectofive.ca/2017/01/27/intelligence-innovation-outside-the-anglosphere-deconstructing-the-sri-lankan-counterterrorism-model-for-obliterating-isis/. Accessed 22 Dec. 2023.

Bajoria, Jayshree. “The Sri Lankan Conflict.” Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, 18 May 2009, www.cfr.org/backgrounder/sri-lankan-conflict.

Ball, Timothy, and Michael Richardson. Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California Thesis, Approved for Public Release. Distribution Is Unlimited. From Successful Defense To Problematic Offense: The Devolution Of Unconventional Warfare. 2016.

Farwell, James P., and Darby J. Arakelian. “Using Information in Contemporary War.” Parameters (Carlisle, Pa.), vol. 46, no. 3, 2016, pp. 71-, https://doi.org/10.55540/0031-1723.2755.

Hammond, Grant T. Paradoxes of War. Joint Forces Quarterly, Spring, 1994.

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Hoffman, Bruce. “A Nasty Business.” The Atlantic, 1 Jan. 2002, www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2002/01/a-nasty-business/302379/.

Katz, Brian. “The Intelligence Edge: Opportunities and Challenges from Emerging Technologies for U.S. Intelligence.” Policy File, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020.

Kuźniak, Brygida, and Ihor Zeman. “World Responsibility to Act in Russia’s War Against Ukraine.” Polish Political Science, vol. 51, no. 4, 2022, pp. 85–94, https://doi.org/10.15804/ppsy202247.

Layton, Peter. “How Sri Lanka Won the War.” Thediplomat.com, 9 Apr. 2015, thediplomat.com/2015/04/how-sri-lanka-won-the-war/.

Nye, Joseph S. “Smart Power and the ‘War on Terror.’” Asia-Pacific Review, vol. 15, no. 1, 2008, pp. 1–8, https://doi.org/10.1080/13439000802134092.

Tidd, John M. “From Revolution to Reform: A Brief History of U.S. Intelligence.” The SAIS Review of International Affairs, vol. 28, no. 1, 2008, pp. 5–24, https://doi.org/10.1353/sais.2008.0016.

Tzu, Sun, and John Minford. “The Art of War.” New England Review (1990), vol. 23, no. 3, 2002, pp. 5–28.

Ronen Bergman and Adam Goldman. “Israel Knew Hamas’s Attack Plan More Than a     Year Ago.” New York Times, 30 November 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/30/world/middleeast/israel-hamas-attack-intelligence.html

“Taming the Tamil Tigers.” FBI, (2008) archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/stories/2008/january/tamil_tigers011008.

Vohra, Anchal. “The United States Wants Peace. The Taliban Wants an Emirate.” Foreign Policy, 27 Dec. 2023, foreignpolicy.com/2020/03/02/afghanistan-agreement-united-states-wants-peace-taliban-wants-emirate/. Accessed 22 Dec. 2023.

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