Addressing an event last week at London’s Oxford University, Sri Lankan Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe said some people are seeing “imaginary Chinese Naval bases in Sri Lanka. Meanwhile, the Hambantota Port (in southern Sri Lanka) is a commercial joint venture between our Ports Authority and China Merchants – a company listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.”

The Prime Minister of Sri Lanka, Wickremesinghe, has dismissed the recent claims made by the US that China plans to establish a “forward military base” at the Hambantota port, which the Sri Lankan government has leased out to Beijing. The Sri Lankan government had to lease the China-developed port for 99 years after failing to pay back a Chinese loan of $1.4 billion. India and the US had earlier expressed concerns that the port could be used by China for military purposes.

The USA, China, and India are significant players in the ongoing “Neo-Cold War” in Central Asia and the strategic sea lanes of the Indian Ocean. These sea lanes, including oil, transport 90% of the world’s trade. This race can be seen as the reason behind US Vice President Mike Pence’s recent comment that China is using “debt diplomacy” to expand its global influence. Pence also warned that China’s growing navy may soon use Hambantota as a military base.

Analysts predict the deep-water port along the Asia-Europe shipping route will aid China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

In his book “Monsoon” Robert D. Kaplan (2010), a senior fellow at the Centre for a New American Security, notes the following:

[…] the Indian Ocean will turn into the heart of a new geopolitical map, shifting from a unilateral world power to multilateral power cooperation. This transition is caused by the changing economic and military conditions of the USA, China and India. The Indian Ocean will play a big role in the 21st century’s confrontation for geopolitical power. The greater Indian Ocean region covers an arc of Islam, from the Sahara Desert to the Indonesian archipelago. Its western reaches include Somalia, Yemen, Iran, and Pakistan — constituting a network of dynamic trade as well as a network of global terrorism, piracy, and drug trafficking […]

Nearly two-thirds of the global maritime trade passes through a handful of relatively narrow shipping lanes. Among these lanes are five geographic “chokepoints,” narrow channels that serve as gateways to and from the Indian Ocean. These five chokepoints are (1) the Strait of Hormuz, (2) the Bab el-Mandab Passage, (3) the Palk Strait, (4) the Malacca and Singapore Straits, and (5) the Sunda Strait.

While Lutz Kleveman (2003) argues that Central Asia is increasingly becoming the most critical geostrategic region for future commodities, Michael Richardson (2004) explains that the global economy depends on the free flow of shipping through the strategic international straits, waterways, and canals in the Indian Ocean.

According to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) report published in 2017, “world chokepoints for maritime transit of oil are a critical part of global energy security. About 63% of the world’s oil production moves on maritime routes. The Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca are the two most important strategic chokepoints in the world regarding the volume of oil transit. As many goods pass through these channels, they are immensely important for world trade. In fact, almost half of the world’s oil production is transported through these maritime routes. A blockage of a chokepoint, even for a day, can substantially increase total energy costs. That’s why these chokepoints are a critical part of global energy security. Whoever controls these chokepoints, waterways, and sea routes in the Indian Ocean maritime domain will significantly impact the region as an emerging global power.

In a recent analysis of globalization and its impact on Central Asia and the Indian Ocean region, researcher Daniel Alphonsus (2015) notes that the twists and turns of political, economic, and military turbulence were significant to all great players’ grand strategies:

(1) the One Belt, One Road (OBOR), China’s anticipated strategy to increase connectivity and trade between Eurasian nations, a part of which is the future Maritime Silk Road (MSR), aimed at furthering collaboration between south east Asia, Oceania and East Africa; (2) Project Mausam, India’s struggle to reconnect with its ancient trading partners along the Indian Ocean, broadly viewed as its answer to the MSR; and (3) the Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor, the USA’s effort to better connect south and south east Asian nations. (p.3)

India, the superpower of the subcontinent, has long feared China’s role in building outposts around its periphery. In a recent essay, an Indian commentator, Brahma Chellaney, wrote that the fusion of China’s economic and military interests “risk turning Sri Lanka into India’s Cuba” – a reference to how the Soviet Union courted Fidel Castro’s Cuba right on the United States’ doorstep. Located at the Indian Ocean’s crossroads gives Sri Lanka strategic and economic weight in both MSR and Project Mausam plans. MSR highlights Sri Lanka’s position on the east-west sea route. Project Mausam aims to create an “Indian Ocean World” that places Sri Lanka at the center of the twenty-first century’s defining economic, strategic, and institutional frameworks. Furthermore, alongside the MSR, China is building an energy pipeline through Pakistan to secure Arabian petroleum, a measure intended to bypass the Indian Ocean and the Strait of Malacca altogether.

A recent study done by a panel of experts and reported by the New York Times reveals how the power has increasingly shifted towards China from the traditional US-led world order among small nation-states in the region in the past five years. The strategic seaports being built by China around the Indian Ocean, such as the Port of Gwadar in Pakistan, the Port of Hambantota in Sri Lanka, the Port of Kyaukpyu in Myanmar, and the Port of Chittagong in Bangladesh, are playing a critical role in China’s power projection. These small states are being used as proxies to advance China’s interests.

The competition among global powers is ongoing in a highly significant geostrategic area. It encompasses political, economic, and military aspects. This is viewed as the beginning of a “Neo-Cold War.” Joseph Troupe describes this conflict as a representation of the geopolitical rivalry of the post-Soviet era. It also results from the emerging multipolar world order.

Image credit: Wikipedia Public Domain

References

Alphonsus, D. (2018, June 30). Cartopolitics and Sri Lanka: Rereading and Repainting Twenty-First Century Asia. Retrieved from http://www.caravanmagazine.in/vantage/cartopolitics-and-sri-lanka-rereading-and-repainting-twenty-first-century-asia

Chellaney, B. (2015, August 13). Sri Lanka election to decide whether to bow to China. Retrieved from https://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/sri-lanka-election-to-decide-whether-to-bow-to-china/news-story/a8e92bc29d75fef549ad64c1cfc68bc8

Fisher, M., & Carlsen, A. (2018, March 09). How China Is Challenging American Dominance in Asia. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/03/09/world/asia/china-us-asia-rivalry.html?smid=tw-share#g-sources-target

Grare, F. (2008, July). Along the road: Gwadar and China’s power projection. Retrieved October 13, 2018, from https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief7Gwadar0.pdf

Kaplan, R. D. (2010, November 19). Monsoon – By Robert D. Kaplan. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/21/books/review/excerpt-monsoon.html

Kleveman, L. (2004). The new great game: Blood and Oil in Central Asia. London: Atlantic.

Press Information Bureau Government of India Ministry of Culture (2014, June 21). Project ‘Mausam’ Launched by Secretary, Ministry of Culture. Retrieved October 13, 2018, from http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=105777

Richardson, M. (2007). A Time bomb for global trade: Maritime-related terrorism in an age of weapons of mass destruction. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

Sri Lanka rejects US claims, says no Chinese military base at port. (2018, October 11). Retrieved from https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/sri-lanka-rejects-us-   claims-says-no-chinese-military-base-at-port/articleshow/66163389.cms

U.S. Energy Information Administration – EIA – Independent Statistics and Analysis. (2017). Retrieved from https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=32292