In May 2025, Operation Sindoor reminded India that future conflicts will demand not only precision strikes and layered air defence, but also the ability to move forces and firepower rapidly across fronts. Theatreisation, now gaining momentum with the activation of the Inter-Services Organisations Act rules and the CDS empowered to issue binding joint orders, is meant to deliver exactly that: seamless, joint mobilisation. But the reality on the ground shows that India’s rapid deployment capacity remains a work in progress.
The Infrastructure Challenge
Over the last decade, the Border Roads Organisation (BRO) has accelerated the pace of building roads, tunnels, and bridges in high-altitude areas. Projects such as the Sela Tunnel in Arunachal Pradesh and the Zojila Tunnel in Kashmir are shortening response times. Yet logistics bottlenecks persist: limited advance landing grounds, single-road vulnerabilities in Ladakh and the Northeast, and fragile bridges that cannot support heavy armour during winter months. Rapid deployment begins with tarmac and asphalt; without resilient infrastructure, theatreisation is a strategy on paper.
The Rotary & Airlift Gap
The weakness of India’s rotary and heavy-lift fleets is perhaps the most glaring constraint. Fifteen Chinooks serve admirably in Ladakh, ferrying M777 howitzers and bridging equipment. But this fleet is too small for the demands of a two-front scenario. The Indian Multi-Role Helicopter (IMRH) remains years from induction, and there is no confirmed second Chinook tranche. Meanwhile, Mi-17s are ageing out, reducing medium-lift capacity. Without sufficient lift, rapid mobilisation is slowed to the pace of roads and rails — a strategic handicap against adversaries with better integrated air mobility.
Joint Logistics as the Glue
The Inter-Services Organisations Act (2023), whose rules were notified in May 2025, gave teeth to the idea of joint structures. And in June, the CDS was empowered to issue binding joint orders. This is a crucial step: without joint logistics commands, each service hoards its assets. Sindoor showed why this must change. Army formations needed airlift and rotary support at short notice; integration across services was still cumbersome. Theatreisation will only succeed if logistics are pooled and task-assigned, not service-bound.
The Readiness Equation
Rapid mobilisation is more than machines; it is also about pre-positioning and stockpiling. Fuel, ammunition, spares, and bridging kits must be forward-deployed, not trickled in after the fact. Exercises in 2024–25 revealed that some formations were still too reliant on long supply chains from central depots. By contrast, China’s Western Theatre Command has invested heavily in pre-positioned depots along the Tibetan plateau. India cannot afford to lag.
Reforms to Perform
The path to readiness requires three reforms:
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Invest in Infrastructure at Speed: Complete critical tunnels and bridges, expand advanced landing grounds, and harden dual-use logistics corridors.
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Expand Air Mobility: Commit to a second Chinook tranche or a parallel heavy-lift program, accelerate IMRH, and create hybrid Army-Air Force tasking for rotary fleets.
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Institutionalise Joint Logistics: Create a standing Joint Logistics Command to manage supplies, airlift, and pre-positioning across theatres, with binding authority under the CDS.
Final Thoughts
Operation Sindoor was a wake-up call. Air defence and precision strikes stole the headlines, but behind the scenes, logistics and rapid mobilisation made the difference between a contained battle and potential escalation. In the next war, India will not be judged only on how many threats it shoots down, but also on how quickly it can move, reinforce, and sustain.
Theatreisation gives India the structure; rapid mobilisation will give it the muscle. Winning future wars will depend as much on highways and helipads as on missiles and fighters. If India wants theatre commands that work, it must first build the ability to move.