In June 2020, amid a global pandemic and economic paralysis, Indian and Chinese troops clashed violently in Ladakh’s Galwan Valley. The confrontation — the deadliest between the two sides in more than half a century — was not an accident of patrol routes or miscommunication. It was the culmination of a strategic continuum that began in 1962: a pattern of negotiation followed by surprise, of treaties signed only to be broken, of peace postures masking preparation for conflict.
Beijing’s conduct in Galwan exposed how modern Chinese statecraft fuses military opportunism with diplomatic ambiguity. The tactics had evolved; the underlying principle had not. What Mao Zedong executed through large-scale invasion, Xi Jinping’s China achieved through calibrated coercion — asserting territorial control while preserving deniability under the language of “differing perceptions” along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).
The Clash in the Valley
On the night of June 15, 2020, Chinese and Indian soldiers confronted each other on a narrow ridge above the Galwan River. The engagement involved no firearms, yet it was brutally lethal. Chinese troops, in violation of existing confidence-building agreements, arrived armed with spiked clubs, iron rods, and barbed-wire batons. In the ensuing melee, twenty Indian soldiers, including Colonel B. Santosh Babu, were killed. Independent assessments suggest that more than forty Chinese soldiers also lost their lives, though Beijing has never confirmed the figures.
The weapon of choice — crude, hand-held instruments — was not incidental. The 1996 Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures had prohibited the use of firearms within two kilometres of the LAC. What was intended as a peace measure became, in practice, an asymmetrical advantage for China. Beijing used a clause meant to prevent war to execute controlled violence, ensuring plausible deniability under the guise of compliance.
A Calculated Breach
The Galwan incident occurred during an agreed disengagement process following weeks of high-level military talks. The area had been tense but stable until Chinese troops suddenly altered the status quo, erecting tents and fortifications inside territory India considered its own. When Indian soldiers arrived to verify the withdrawal terms, they were ambushed.
This was not a local commander’s miscalculation. Satellite imagery and intercepted communications indicate that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had prepared the ground weeks in advance — deploying troops, constructing shelters, and reinforcing logistical routes. Beijing’s later statements, accusing India of crossing the LAC, followed a familiar script: deny, deflect, and invert the narrative.
In substance, the events in Galwan mirrored the deception of 1962. Then, as now, China negotiated while advancing, invoking peace even as it altered realities on the ground.
Broken Agreements and Eroded Trust
The Galwan clash shattered the fragile architecture built over three decades of bilateral pacts. The 1993 Border Peace and Tranquillity Agreement, the 1996 CBMs, and the 2013 Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (BDCA) had all been designed to prevent precisely this outcome. By ambushing Indian troops during a disengagement dialogue, Beijing rendered these treaties void in practice.
Subsequent reports of Chinese incursions at Depsang, Demchok, and other friction points reinforced the perception that Galwan was not an isolated transgression but part of a broader campaign to incrementally shift the LAC in China’s favour. The unveiling of a Chinese “border law” in 2022, which standardised Chinese names for places in Arunachal Pradesh and codified the defence of “claimed” territories, added a legal veneer to these violations.
Each of these moves followed the same logic: to transform contested zones into faits accomplis while blaming “differing perceptions” for the escalation. In diplomatic forums, Beijing continued to insist on dialogue — a duality that allowed it to present itself as a responsible stakeholder even as it deepened confrontation.
India’s Response: Restraint and Resolve
India’s reaction was uncharacteristically swift and multi-dimensional. Militarily, the Indian Army matched Chinese deployments with mirror reinforcements across Ladakh. New infrastructure projects — including roads, bridges, and advanced airstrips — were expedited to strengthen mobility and logistics.
Politically, New Delhi reframed its engagement principles through what the Ministry of External Affairs termed the “Three Mutuals” — mutual respect, mutual sensitivity, and mutual interests — a concise articulation of the preconditions for restoring trust. Economically, India imposed restrictions on Chinese investments, banned more than 300 mobile applications, and enhanced scrutiny of supply-chain dependencies.
In contrast to 1962, India avoided paralysis. Even under provocation, Indian troops refrained from crossing the LAC or using firearms, adhering to discipline while asserting control over key heights in the Pangong Tso area. The message was deliberate: India would uphold restraint but no longer underwrite illusion.
The Tactical Disengagement
Following numerous rounds of military and diplomatic talks, disengagement eventually occurred at selected flashpoints. Yet the outcome was far from a restoration of pre-2020 conditions. Patrolling rights in areas such as Depsang and Demchok remained restricted, effectively freezing Indian access to zones it previously dominated. Analysts interpreted these arrangements as “tactical disengagements” — de-escalation in appearance, consolidation in effect.
By October 2024, when both sides reportedly agreed to resume limited patrolling, the structure of the LAC had subtly changed. China had not relinquished its forward positions or dismantled the extensive infrastructure it built during the standoff. The crisis may have subsided, but the underlying asymmetry persisted.
The End of Assumptions
Galwan marked a strategic rupture in India’s China policy. The premise that dialogue could coexist with trust was no longer tenable. The 2020 clash underscored that Beijing’s interpretation of agreements remains transactional — valid only when advantageous. In Beijing’s calculus, ambiguity is leverage; peace is a tactic, not a principle.
The PLA’s behaviour also signalled a doctrinal shift: from overt territorial expansion to psychological attrition. By demonstrating the capacity for calibrated violence short of war, China sought to instil caution in its adversary without crossing thresholds that would invite global condemnation. It was coercion without escalation — diplomacy conducted with batons instead of artillery.
The Persistence of Pattern
From the Himalayan peaks of 1962 to the icy riverbanks of Galwan in 2020, China’s playbook has remained remarkably consistent. Each episode has followed a familiar rhythm — charm, negotiation, provocation, and denial. The instruments have changed, the leadership has changed, but the logic endures: advance when the opponent trusts, retreat when confronted, and redefine the status quo in the process.
For India, Galwan was more than a border skirmish. It was the collapse of a decades-long experiment in confidence-building with a neighbour that views confidence as a vulnerability. The tragedy of 1962 had begun with misplaced faith in goodwill; the tragedy of 2020 lies in the confirmation that faith was never warranted.