For much of the twentieth century, China presented itself as a champion of peace and anti-imperialism, yet its conduct toward India tells a different story — one of convenience, opportunism, and selective fidelity to international commitments. From the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in 1954 to the confidence-building agreements of the post-Cold War period, Beijing’s pattern has remained remarkably consistent: sign, stall, and subvert.
This behaviour is not an aberration but the product of an enduring worldview within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) — that law and diplomacy are tools of power, not constraints upon it. The result has been a cycle of negotiated optimism followed by strategic betrayal that has spanned seven decades of Sino-Indian relations.
Origins of Distrust
When the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was founded in 1949 after years of civil war, its new rulers inherited a deep suspicion of international law. The CCP saw treaties as the instruments of humiliation imposed by Western imperial powers on a weak Qing Empire. Determined never again to be constrained by foreign norms, Beijing refused to recognise many agreements signed by the Nationalist government it had displaced.
That scepticism soon extended to China’s neighbours. In 1950, the PRC abruptly shut down the Indian consulate in Kashgar after annexing Xinjiang, offering no formal notification. The move signalled an emerging pattern: Beijing would invoke sovereignty to justify unilateral action while demanding deference from others in the name of solidarity.
Panchsheel and the Illusion of Coexistence
India’s response was guided by optimism. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru believed that Asian unity could transcend ideological divides. In 1954, he negotiated the Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India, better known as the Panchsheel Agreement, built around five principles — mutual respect for sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.
For India, Panchsheel symbolised moral leadership in a decolonising world. For China, it was a tactical necessity. Recognised sovereignty over Tibet gave Beijing the diplomatic cover it needed to consolidate control there and to build infrastructure connecting Tibet to Xinjiang through Aksai Chin — the very road whose discovery later triggered border tensions.
Within months of signing the agreement, Chinese troops began testing India’s resolve with patrols in Barahoti and Longju. By 1959, following the Tibetan uprising and the Dalai Lama’s flight to India, the façade of fraternity collapsed. Three years later, the PLA’s invasion buried Panchsheel under the rubble of artillery fire.
The Post-War Pacts: Promises Made, Promises Broken
The 1962 war exposed the fragility of India’s faith in diplomacy. Yet successive governments in both countries continued to seek accommodation through negotiated frameworks. Each was designed to prevent conflict — and each, in turn, became another casualty of Beijing’s shifting priorities.
1993 — The Border Peace and Tranquillity Agreement (BPTA)
The first major pact after 1962 committed both sides to respect the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and to resolve disputes peacefully. It marked a thaw in the aftermath of the Cold War and was intended to create a stable frontier. But Chinese incursions — from Depsang in 2013 to Galwan in 2020 — have repeatedly violated its spirit.
1996 — The Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs)
Building on the 1993 accord, the CBMs prohibited military exercises near the LAC and banned the use of firearms within two kilometres of the line. Two decades later, Chinese soldiers wielded nail-studded clubs and iron rods at Galwan — exploiting the very clause that forbade guns. The rule meant to preserve peace became a loophole for controlled violence.
2005 — The Protocol on Political Parameters and Guiding Principles
This pact emphasised that boundary differences should not impede broader relations and that settlements should respect “settled populations.” Yet Beijing’s subsequent claims in Arunachal Pradesh and its renaming of Indian villages in 2022 directly contradicted that undertaking.
2013 — The Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (BDCA)
Signed amid growing tensions, the BDCA sought to prevent small patrol incidents from escalating. Seven years later, in Galwan, Chinese troops ambushed an Indian unit during a supposed disengagement — a textbook violation of the accord’s core clause urging restraint.
A Culture of Expediency
Behind these repeated breaches lies a structural logic. For the CCP, the legitimacy of the state is tied to territorial integrity, which is in turn defined by historical narratives rather than by existing boundaries. Agreements are therefore instruments for managing perceptions, not binding contracts. Once an accord ceases to serve Beijing’s interests, it is quietly hollowed out.
This approach allows China to appear reasonable on paper while maintaining coercive leverage on the ground. The absence of a mutually recognised LAC map further enables calibrated ambiguity — a diplomatic grey zone that Beijing exploits to shift realities without formally breaking peace.
Erosion of Trust
The cumulative effect of these betrayals has been profound. Each diplomatic engagement that ends in deceit narrows the space for compromise. The 2017 Doklam standoff, where China attempted to extend a road into Bhutanese territory near India’s strategic tri-junction, revived the memory of 1962. The Galwan clash three years later confirmed that the cycle was still intact: negotiation, violation, denial, and renewed calls for dialogue.
For India, the implication is clear. Agreements with China have limited shelf-life when their enforcement depends on goodwill rather than verifiable mechanisms. The trust deficit is no longer a diplomatic issue but a structural reality.
Paper Walls on a Mountain Frontier
From Panchsheel to Galwan, Beijing’s record reveals a disciplined opportunism — a belief that diplomacy is valuable chiefly as a prelude to advantage. What began in the 1950s as an ideological disdain for “imperialist law” has evolved into a sophisticated art of controlled compliance: fulfilling the letter of an agreement while violating its intent.
For policymakers in New Delhi, the lesson is both historical and immediate. Peace cannot rest on parchment; it must be backed by preparedness, surveillance, and credible deterrence. Until China recognises treaties as binding rather than tactical, the Himalayas will remain not a frontier of coexistence but a theatre of vigilance.