The Trident Nexus: An Analytical Report on the Convergence of LTTE Remnants, D-Company, and the ISI for Narco-Terrorism and Strategic Destabilization

This report provides a strategic analysis of an emerging narco-terrorist network, the “Trident Nexus,” which represents a symbiotic, state-sponsored alliance between remnants of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the D-Company organized crime syndicate, and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).

The report argues that the LTTE’s 2009 military defeat resulted not in its eradication, but in a strategic mutation. Its surviving intelligence wing, the Tiger Organization Security Intelligence Service (TOSIS), has evolved into a sophisticated transnational Organized Criminal Network (OCN). This network has been co-opted by the ISI and D-Company to establish a secure “Southern Route” for narcotics trafficking, bypassing compromised routes in northern and western India.

Based on a synthesis of National Investigation Agency (NIA) case files, this analysis details the “arms-for-drugs” model that finances the LTTE’s revival. The 2021 seizure of the Sri Lankan vessel Ravihansi serves as definitive evidence, yielding a consolidated shipment of 300kg of heroin, five AK-47 rifles, and Pakistan-made ammunition.

The report maps the network’s command structure, identifying:

1. Haji Salim: A Karachi-based kingpin and alleged associate of both D-Company and the ISI, who functions as the primary supplier of narcotics and arms.

2. Satkunam alias Sabesan: A senior TOSIS operative, “closely associated” with former LTTE intelligence chief Pottu Amman, who acts as the key conspirator coordinating the plot.

3. Gunasekharan alias Guna: The on-ground coordinator, who operated the trade from a Special Camp in Tiruchi, India.

4. Lingam alias Adi Lingam: The network’s financier, who laundered drug proceeds through hawala networks and investments in the Tamil film industry.

The analysis establishes that this ISI-TOSIS nexus is not a new phenomenon but an evolution of a documented 2014 ISI espionage ring that used Sri Lanka as a base to recruit LTTE-linked individuals for anti-India operations. The report concludes that this Trident Nexus constitutes a systemic threat, leveraging organized crime to finance a terror revival and strategically destabilize India’s southern flank.

I. Strategic Assessment: The Emergence of a New Narco-Terror Axis

Executive Summary

This report provides a strategic analysis of an emerging, multi-faceted narco-terrorist network, hereafter referred to as the Trident Nexus, comprising remnants of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the D-Company organized crime syndicate, and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Based on a comprehensive review of case files from Indian investigative agencies, including the National Investigation Agency (NIA), this assessment concludes that the 2009 military defeat of the LTTE in Sri Lanka did not eradicate the organization but rather triggered a strategic mutation. The LTTE’s formidable international network, primarily driven by remnants of its intelligence wing, the Tiger Organization Security Intelligence Service (TOSIS), has metastasized and entered into a strategic, mutually beneficial alliance with D-Company and its state sponsor, the ISI.

The Threat Defined

This nexus transcends a mere opportunistic, short-term “crime-terror” overlap. It represents a structured, state-sponsored narco-terror operation. This operation combines the distinct capabilities of its three components:

1. 1. 1. Pakistan’s ISI: Providing strategic direction, state-level protection, and the high-value supply of narcotics from the Golden Crescent and weapons from Pakistan’s own ordnance factories.¹
      2. D-Company: Leveraging its established global criminal logistics, financial (hawala) networks, and control of maritime smuggling routes originating from the Makran coast.²
      3. LTTE (TOSIS) Remnants: Contributing their “coastal know-how,” maritime expertise in the Palk Strait, and, most critically, their established clandestine distribution and support networks within Sri Lanka and the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu.²

Core Objectives of the Nexus

The objectives of this alliance are twofold, serving the distinct goals of its participants.

First, for the ISI and D-Company, the alliance is a strategic-commercial venture. Following significant crackdowns by Indian agencies on narcotics routes in western and northern India, the syndicate required a new, secure trafficking corridor. This “Southern Route” leverages LTTE-controlled channels to smuggle contraband into southern India and Sri Lanka, opening a new, lucrative market and transshipment hub.²

Second, for the LTTE remnants, the objective is revival. The alliance provides a critical “financial lifeline” ² and a direct, reliable supply of arms. NIA investigations have repeatedly concluded that the proceeds from this drug trade are being used for “funding acquisition and amassing of weapons for the revival of LTTE” in both India and Sri Lanka.³

Reconciling the ‘Spent Force’ Paradox

The emergence of this network resolves an apparent contradiction in threat assessments. On one hand, credible international bodies, including the United Kingdom’s Upper Tribunal and the International Crisis Group, have assessed the LTTE as a “spent force” militarily, “completely combat ineffective” and incapable of regrouping within Sri Lanka.⁷ On the other hand, Indian security agencies are conducting active counter-terror operations against a network actively plotting an LTTE “revival”.³

The evidence indicates that both assessments are correct when viewed through the proper lens. The LTTE’s conventional military wing is indeed a spent force. The threat has mutated. The surviving, and most durable, component of the LTTE is its international criminal and intelligence apparatus (TOSIS). This apparatus has now evolved into a sophisticated, transnational Organized Criminal Network (OCN), a finding validated by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).⁸ This OCN, led by former TOSIS operatives, now functions as a potent proxy network. The “revival” sought is not a return to conventional insurgency, but the re-establishment of a clandestine, terror-financing network, sponsored by a foreign state (ISI) and fueled by crime (D-Company).

II. Anatomy of the Network: Evidence from NIA Investigations

The structure of this nexus has been exposed through a series of interconnected investigations by Indian agencies. The evidence moves from tactical seizures to the identification of the network’s command and control (C2) hubs.

Case File: The Ravihansi Seizure (The ‘Smoking Gun’)

The most definitive evidence of the “arms-for-drugs” model employed by this nexus is the seizure of the Sri Lankan fishing vessel Ravihansi.

1. 1. • The Incident: On March 18, 2021, the Indian Coast Guard intercepted the Ravihansi in the Arabian Sea, off Minicoy, Lakshadweep.⁴
      • The Contraband: The vessel’s cargo was not limited to narcotics; it was a consolidated shipment of both drugs and weapons, confirming the narco-terror link. The seizure included:
        • Approximately 300 kg of high-grade heroin.⁴
        • Five AK-47 rifles.⁹
        • 1,000 rounds of 9mm ammunition.⁹
      • The Origin: Subsequent analysis of the seized 9mm ammunition revealed it to be “mostly Pakistan Ordnance Factory made”.¹ This provides a direct evidentiary link between the contraband, the LTTE operatives on board, and the Pakistani state.
      • The Operatives: The NIA, which subsequently took over the case, arrested the Sri Lankan crew and their Indian handlers. The investigation confirmed the direct LTTE connection:
        • Two Tamil Nadu natives, Suresh Raj and Soundarajan, were arrested and identified as members of the proscribed LTTE, “working secretly” for the organization.⁹
        • Another arrested individual, Ahamad Fasly, admitted during custodial investigation that he had “collected huge amounts for the activities of LTTE through drugs and gold smuggling and hawala operations”.⁹

The Ravihansi case file provides a concrete operational map of the “Southern Route.” This route originates with a Pakistani supplier (Haji Salim) providing Pakistan-made arms and Golden Crescent-origin narcotics.¹ The contraband is likely transferred from a “mother ship” originating from the Makran coast—a D-Company and Haji Salim stronghold ¹²—to a smaller, deniable Sri Lankan vessel (the Ravihansi) in the deep Arabian Sea. This vessel, crewed by LTTE-linked operatives, then traffics the consignment for distribution in Sri Lanka and southern India, leveraging the LTTE’s established maritime expertise as described in intelligence reports.²

The Pakistani Lynchpin: Haji Salim’s Network

Investigations into the Ravihansi seizure and other related narcotics busts quickly identified a central figure: Haji Salim.

1. 1. • Profile: Salim is a Pakistani national identified by Indian agencies as the “kingpin” of this trafficking racket.¹⁴
      • The Trilateral Connection: Haji Salim is the single individual who links all three pillars of the Trident Nexus. He is identified in agency reports as both an “alleged associate of the ISI” and an “alleged associate of… Dawood Ibrahim’s syndicate”.¹
      • Link to LTTE: The NIA investigation into the LTTE revival plot explicitly names Haji Salim as the “supplier” for the network. He is documented as “operating the illegal drugs and arms trade” in direct coordination with the LTTE’s on-ground leader, Gunasekharan alias Guna.³
      • Operational Signature: Salim’s network is vast, operating across the Indian Ocean ¹ and linked to multiple high-volume seizures, including a 2,500 kg methamphetamine bust worth approx. 20,000 crore.¹³ His consignments are often identified by unique markings, including “scorpion” seals, “dragon” seals, and “555 Rolex” seals, allowing agencies to attribute various seizures to his single network.¹²

The Indian Hub: Operations from the Tiruchi Special Camp

One of the most alarming findings by the NIA was the location of the network’s C2 hub. This was not in a remote safe house, but in plain sight.

1. 1. • The Anomaly: NIA investigators alleged that the “prime suspect” in the case, Gunasekharan alias Guna, along with his associate Pushparaj alias Pookutti Kanna, was “operating the illegal drugs and arms trade from the Special Camp in Tiruchi”.³
      • Exploiting a ‘Safe Haven’: This finding indicates a significant counter-intelligence failure and a high degree of operational audacity. The LTTE network’s leadership co-opted the Special Camp, a facility designed to house Sri Lankan refugees, as a secure base of operations. From within this camp, the network’s leaders were able to conduct “conspiracy meetings” ⁵ and coordinate their international smuggling operation—communicating with Haji Salim in Pakistan and their operatives in Sri Lanka—all while under the nominal supervision of Indian authorities. This demonstrates a sophisticated understanding of how to exploit administrative gaps to create a secure C2 node.

III. The Command Structure: Key Individuals and Roles

The NIA investigations have successfully mapped the hierarchy of the LTTE revival network, revealing a clear division of labor between intelligence coordination, on-ground operations, and financial management.

The TOSIS Conspirator: Satkunam alias Sabesan

The profile of Satkunam alias Sabesan confirms that this network is being directed by seasoned intelligence operatives, not just disparate former cadres.

1. 1. • Profile: Sabesan is a 47-year-old Sri Lankan Tamil and a “senior intelligence operative” of the defunct LTTE.⁴
      • TOSIS Pedigree: His affiliation is not ambiguous. He is identified as a former member of the LTTE’s intelligence wing (TOSIS).⁵ Agency sources describe him as one of LTTE leader V. Prabhakaran’s “trusted lieutenants” and, most significantly, as having been “closely associated” with the notorious LTTE intelligence chief, Pottu Amman.⁴ This directly links the current revival plot to the LTTE’s historical high command.
      • Current Function: The NIA identifies Sabesan as the “key conspirator” in the Ravihansi (also known as the Vizhinjam) arms case.⁴ His function was not tactical but strategic, acting as the high-level coordinator for the operation.
      • Specific Roles (per NIA):
        1. Clandestine Cell-Building: He “arranged conspiracy meetings of sympathisers of LTTE in India”.⁵ This is classic intelligence tradecraft for establishing a covert cell structure.
        2. Financial Routing: He “played a crucial role in routing the proceeds of drugs trafficking to former LTTE cadres in Sri Lanka for the revival of LTTE”.⁵
        3. International Liaison: After his release from a 10-year prison sentence on a previous drug charge, Sabesan “revived his contacts” with the international network. His communications confirmed connections with drug peddlers in “Pakistan, Dubai and Sri Lanka” ⁴—the primary operational territories of the ISI/D-Company.

The On-Ground Coordinator: Gunasekharan alias Guna

While Sabesan provided the high-level intelligence coordination, Gunasekharan managed the day-to-day logistics of the arms and drug trade.

1. 1. • Profile: Guna is a Sri Lankan citizen and the “prime suspect” in the LTTE revival case.³
      • Current Function: Along with his son Thilipan ¹⁷, Guna is identified as the lead operative who managed the entire drug and arms trade from the Tiruchi Special Camp.³ He was the network’s direct point of contact for the Pakistani supplier, Haji Salim.³

The Financier and Launderer: Lingam alias Adi Lingam

The network’s financial operations were managed by Lingam alias Adi Lingam, a key conspirator with a background that made him uniquely suited for the role.

1. 1. • Profile: A resident of Chennai, Adi Lingam was “formerly employed in a Central Armed Police Force” ³, giving him specialized insight into Indian security protocols and procedures.
      • Dual Function: Adi Lingam served two critical financial roles:
        1. Hawala Agent: He “acted as an agent for collection of hawala money obtained from the sale of narcotic drugs”.¹⁷ This illicit cash was then “further distributed to promote LTTE activities”.¹⁸
        2. Money Launderer: He acted as a benami (frontman) for Guna’s illegal transactions.³
      • The ‘Film Industry’ Laundromat: The network’s laundering mechanism demonstrates a high level of sophistication, moving beyond simple hawala into legitimate-appearing investments. Multiple reports confirm that Adi Lingam “had extensive connections in the Tamil film industry” and worked as a “production executive”.³ He used these connections for “certain investments,” and the NIA is conducting an in-depth probe into “how the ill-gotten money was parked in the industry”.³ The choice of the film industry is strategically intelligent: it is a notoriously cash-intensive business, providing an ideal vehicle for co-mingling illicit and legitimate funds. Furthermore, it offers a potential secondary benefit: a powerful platform for “soft power” influence and propaganda, echoing the LTTE’s historical use of its own media divisions, such as Nitharsanam (television) and Pulikalin Kural (radio), to shape public opinion and build support for its secessionist ideology.¹⁹

Table 1: Key Network Personnel, Affiliations, and Functions

IV. The Strategic Nexus: A History of ISI-TOSIS Collaboration

The query’s focus on the intelligence nexus between TOSIS and the ISI is central to understanding this threat. The current narco-terror alliance is not an ad-hoc arrangement; it is built upon a documented foundation of collaboration against a common adversary: India.

Historical Precedent: The 2014 South India Spy Module

Years before the Ravihansi seizure, Indian agencies, including the NIA, dismantled a potent ISI-run espionage ring operating from Sri Lanka.²² This case serves as the blueprint for the current nexus.

1. 1. • ISI’s Modus Operandi: The ISI used its legitimate diplomatic missions in Sri Lanka as “staging grounds” for anti-India activity.²² An ISI handler, Amir Zubair Siddiqui, who was officially posted as a “counselor” in the visa section at the Pakistani High Commission in Colombo, was identified as the handler tasking agents to conduct espionage in South India.²²
      • The Agent and Targets: The ISI’s principal agent, Muhammad Zakir Husain, a Sri Lankan national, was arrested in Tamil Nadu.²³ He had conducted reconnaissance and photographed “vital Indian installations”.²² His targets were not random; they were highly strategic:
        • The U.S. Consulate in Chennai and the Israeli Consulate in Bengaluru, for a planned terrorist attack.²²
        • The Eastern Naval Command in Visakhapatnam and the Southern Naval Command in Kochi.²²
      • The First ISI-LTTE Link: The most significant finding from the 2014 investigation was the link between this ISI ring and the LTTE. The NIA’s probe into Husain’s network led to the arrest of Arun Selvarajan, a Sri Lankan identified as a suspected LTTE sympathizer.²² Selvarajan had used his event management company as a front to infiltrate and survey Indian military installations, including the Officer Training Academy (OTA) and Coast Guard office in Chennai.²²

The 2014 spy ring was the pathfinder operation for the current 2021 narco-terror network. It established a clear, documented precedent for two key strategic behaviors:

1. 1. 1. The ISI’s use of Sri Lanka as a third-country base from which to target India’s sensitive southern flank, particularly its critical maritime and military infrastructure.
      2. The ISI’s willingness—and success—in recruiting LTTE-linked individuals and sympathizers for this anti-India mission.

The 2014 case proves the collaborative framework existed. The 2021 Ravihansi case demonstrates this collaboration evolving from intelligence gathering to active narco-terrorism and financing for a revival. The ISI was not starting from scratch; it was activating and arming a previously established proxy network.

Strategic Blowback: Weaponizing an Indian-Trained Proxy

The ISI-TOSIS nexus represents a profound and ironic case of strategic blowback for India. In the 1980s, India’s Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) provided training and support to several Tamil militant groups, including the LTTE, as leverage against Sri Lanka.¹⁶ This training was not superficial. As records indicate, the second batch of LTTE cadres trained by R&AW in Himachal Pradesh included the “LTTE intelligence chief Pottu Amman”.¹⁶

Decades later, the consequences of this decision are clear. The NIA has arrested Satkunam alias Sabesan, a “senior intelligence operative” ⁴ who was “closely associated” with this same Pottu Amman.⁴ This means the very intelligence tradecraft that India imparted to the LTTE’s intelligence wing—clandestine communication, covert cell creation, and network management—is now being deployed against India’s national security. The ISI has successfully co-opted and weaponized a proxy network whose intelligence lineage traces directly back to Indian training.

The D-Company Bridge: A Convergence of Strategic Interests

Dawood Ibrahim’s D-Company, a long-standing ISI proxy used to execute terror attacks (like the 1993 Bombay bombings ²⁶) and manage narco-terror operations against North India ¹¹, functions as the ideal commercial and logistical cutout. It bridges the gap between Pakistan’s state objectives and the LTTE remnants’ operational needs. This alliance represents a “convergence of motivations” ²⁸ that is highly symbiotic:

1. 1. • For the ISI: It gains a new, deniable proxy force (TOSIS remnants) to destabilize India’s secure and economically vital southern flank, a region previously difficult to penetrate.
      • For D-Company: As noted by Indian intelligence, crackdowns in North/West India forced the syndicate to find new routes. The alliance with LTTE remnants provides specialized “coastal know-how” and a ready-made distribution network in the south.²
      • For LTTE (TOSIS) Remnants: They are a militarily “spent force” ⁷ but possess an “intact” international network ⁷ and unique skills. They lack funds and arms. The alliance provides both: a “financial lifeline” from narcotics ² and a direct supply of Pakistani weapons.¹

V. The Revival’s Financing: Maritime Routes and Laundering Channels

The primary engine of the LTTE revival plot is a sophisticated, multi-stage financial mechanism that converts narcotics into weapons and operational funds.

The “Southern Route” Drug Corridor

The network’s primary artery is the maritime “Southern Route.” This corridor, as identified by UNODC and confirmed by NIA seizures, originates from the Makran Coast of Pakistan and Iran, trafficking Afghan heroin and methamphetamine across the Arabian Sea.⁸ The Ravihansi seizure ⁹ and others linked to Haji Salim ¹² confirm this route is used to service Sri Lanka, Maldives, and the southern coast of India.

Independent analysis by the UNODC validates the NIA’s findings. A UNODC report on Organized Criminal Networks (OCNs) in the Eastern Indian Ocean region confirms that these networks are predominantly hierarchical and that Sri Lankan authorities have identified operatives within them who are “former Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) members.” Critically, the UNODC notes these operatives are “linking some of the OCNs with actors seeking to resurrect the LTTE”.⁸ This provides international, third-party validation that the LTTE’s remnants have successfully integrated into transnational organized crime for the express purpose of revival.

From Narcotics to Operations: The Complete Money Trail

The NIA’s investigations have revealed the complete, four-stage loop for financing the revival:

1. 1. 1. Step 1: Procurement (Arms-for-Drugs): The network uses a barter or direct-sale system, orchestrated by Haji Salim from Pakistan. Narcotics (heroin, meth) are trafficked on vessels like the Ravihansi. The same vessel, or associated vessels, transport the proceeds: cash and, as seen in the Ravihansi case, a return cargo of Pakistan-made weapons.¹
      2. Step 2: Collection (Hawala): The liquid cash proceeds from drug sales in India and Sri Lanka are collected by financial agents. The NIA chargesheet against Adi Lingam identifies him as an “agent for collection of hawala money”.¹⁷ This untraceable cash is used for operational expenses and “distributed to promote LTTE activities”.¹⁸ This method is a modern evolution of the LTTE’s traditional reliance on diaspora extortion and collections.³⁰
      3. Step 3: Laundering (Legitimate Business): Large-scale profits are laundered to appear legitimate. Adi Lingam, acting as a benami (frontman) for Guna ³, leverages his “extensive connections in the Tamil film industry” to “park the ill-gotten money” in “investments”.³
      4. Step 4: Re-investment (Revival): The laundered and collected funds are then “used for funding acquisition and amassing of weapons for the revival of LTTE in both the countries”.³ This completes the financial loop, turning drug profits directly into terror-financing.

VI. Analytical Conclusion and Strategic Implications

Re-evaluating the LTTE Threat

This report concludes that any assessment viewing the LTTE as simply “defeated” is dangerously outdated. While the LTTE as a conventional military force is a “spent force” ⁷, its intelligence and international criminal apparatus (TOSIS remnants) has survived, mutated, and integrated into the global organized crime ecosystem. The UNODC’s identification of former LTTE members within OCNs “seeking to resurrect the LTTE” ⁸ is the most precise and accurate assessment of the current threat. This OCN is a clandestine, patient, and criminally-financed entity.

The Trident Nexus as a Strategic Threat

The convergence of the ISI’s state sponsorship, D-Company’s criminal infrastructure, and TOSIS remnants’ specialized skills creates a potent, durable, and symbiotic narco-terror network. This “Trident Nexus” poses a direct and persistent threat to India’s national security, which manifests in three distinct domains:

1. 1. 1. Security Threat: It actively floods southern India and Sri Lanka with high-grade narcotics and illicit automatic weapons, fueling organized crime and providing the materiel for future terrorist acts.⁹
      2. Economic Threat: It injects vast sums of illicit money (“proceeds of drugs and arms trade”) into the legitimate economy, specifically the Tamil film industry.³ This operation corrupts legitimate institutions, distorts markets, and provides a sophisticated, long-term laundering channel for terror funds.
      3. Geopolitical Threat: It provides the ISI with a deniable and effective proxy force to conduct espionage and subversive activities against India’s most critical military and economic targets in the southern peninsula, a region previously considered geographically secure from Pakistani-sponsored destabilization.²²

Final Assessment

The findings of the National Investigation Agency, as detailed in this report, are not isolated incidents of criminality. They are connected components of a systemic, evolving, and sophisticated strategic threat. This threat weaponizes transnational organized crime to achieve the political and strategic ends of its state sponsor. The alliance is symbiotic: the LTTE remnants gain the funds and arms necessary for their “revival,” while the ISI and D-Company gain a new, lucrative, and strategically vital route for their narco-operations, all while destabilizing their primary regional adversary.

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