China’s Covert Support of the Houthis

Introduction

After the October 7 attack in 2023 by Hamas on Israel, the Houthi rebels opened their playbook against the Israelis on 14 November 2023 when the rebel group’s leader Abdulmalik al-Houthi announced: “Our eyes are open to constantly monitor and search for any Israeli ship in the Red Sea, especially in the Bab al-Mandab, and near Yemeni regional waters.” The very next day, Houthi spokesperson Yahya Sare’e tweeted that the Houthi military would initiate measures against Israeli and Israeli-linked vessels operating in the Red Sea.

Although, the Houthis have also gone on to attack non-Israeli ships, including Chinese vessels. This is despite Houthi political leader Mohammed al-Bukhaiti stating in an interview that Russian and Chinese vessels in the Red Sea region around Yemen will not be attacked as long as they do not have an Israel connection.

Iran, China, and the Houthis

In March 2021, Western diplomats found senior Iranian military and government officials meeting a Turkish business delegation to enhance cooperation on smuggling Iranian oil to buyers in China and Russia to raise capital to fund Tehran’s terror proxies. Beijing purchases crude oil from Iran’s Quds Force, which makes up 90% of its supply. This is done through a network of ‘dark ships’ with hidden ownership that travels with their Automatic Identification System switched off to circumvent sanctions on Iranian exports and imports from Iran.

With China buying nearly all of its oil from Iran, Tehran provides a significant discount of 12-15% per barrel to cover Beijing’s liability from sanctions. Middlemen, hidden money transfers, and rebranding of the oil are done to make it seem like the oil is from a third country, keeping Tehran out of the picture.

Most believe the Houthis are an Iranian proxy actor, but there is a case to be made that the group is just receiving support from Tehran. As a non-state actor operating outside international financial structures, the Houthis neither abide nor are affected by international pressure, enabling them to adopt a more aggressive approach than Iran. The rebel group is also attempting to forge an identity independent of Tehran by pursuing Beijing as a supplier of critical weapons parts, immediately announcing zero Iranian involvement in the Tel Aviv drone attack, shoring up its domestic support base by branding themselves “… as defenders of Palestinians and a resistance against Israel and the United States …”.

Beijing’s talks with Iran to restrain the Houthis have not been successful, having also failed to deter the group via public calls to discontinue attacks on commercial vessels and shipping channels in the Red Sea. In this context, the Chinese could consider initiating a dialogue directly with the Houthis.

Conclusion

The first Chinese ship to be attacked by the Houthis seems to be in March 2024: oil tanker MV Huang Pu was targeted with four anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs). This missile salvo was followed by a wave of suicide drones.

Since April, the cost of shipping freight has more than doubled due to the Houthi attacks, going from $2,706 to $5,901. Compared to 2023, 2024 has witnessed a 523% increase in shipping costs from China to Northern Europe. The average cost for a 40-foot container during the pandemic was $10,377, but considering the pre-pandemic cost of $1,420, there is a significant increase. Perhaps the Houthis wish to involve China and raise public sentiment from the Chinese to further their cause against the Israelis.

Featured Image: Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi (left) shakes hands with Chinese President Xi Jinping at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, February 14, 2023