Intelligence by Deception and the Dark Blueprint of State-Sponsored Terrorism: How Pakistan’s ISI Tactics Inspired Sri Lanka’s Military Intelligence and Shaped the 2019 Easter Sunday Attacks

This paper examines a critical dimension of modern geopolitics in South Asia: the alleged orchestration of terrorist activities by state military intelligence units to further political agendas. Of particular focus is the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and its role in undermining international peace efforts through covert support of militant proxies. The article further investigates how these strategies may have influenced the Sri Lankan military, particularly the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI), culminating in the 2019 Easter Sunday bombings in Sri Lanka—a tragedy that claimed more than 250 lives.

Pakistan’s ISI has long attracted international scrutiny for its double-edged approach to counterterrorism and militancy. While being a partner in the U.S.-led “War on Terror,” the agency has simultaneously been accused of nurturing extremist organizations such as the Taliban and Lashkar-e-Taiba to maintain regional leverage, particularly against India and within Afghanistan (Riedel, 2012). The ISI’s strategic doctrine, often characterized as “plausible deniability,” involves facilitating terrorist operations through non-state actors and then publicly condemning those very acts, thereby obscuring state complicity (Abou Zahab, 2005).

This approach reached international prominence during the 2008 Mumbai attacks, when militants from Lashkar-e-Taiba conducted a coordinated series of shootings and bombings. Subsequent investigations uncovered links between the attackers and ISI operatives, although the Pakistani government denied involvement (Cohen, 2013). The ISI’s operations demonstrate a pattern of state-sponsored terrorism deployed for strategic manipulation, serving both foreign policy objectives and domestic political interests.

A similar modus operandi appears to have surfaced in Sri Lanka, where increasing evidence suggests that the devastating 2019 Easter Sunday bombings may not have been solely the work of Islamist extremists, but rather part of a sophisticated intelligence operation with political motives. Initially, the attack was blamed on National Thowheeth Jama’ath (NTJ), a local jihadist group said to be aligned with the Islamic State (ISIS) (International Crisis Group, 2019). However, investigations and journalistic inquiries have exposed significant intelligence failures and suggest deliberate negligence—or worse, orchestration—by high-ranking military officials (Samarasinghe, 2021).

Among those implicated are Lt. Gen. Suresh Sally, then-director of the State Intelligence Service (SIS), and Lt. Gen. Kapila Hendavitharana, a former chief of military intelligence. Both men were alleged to have been involved in concealing or manipulating intelligence that could have prevented the attacks. According to Samarasinghe (2021), the delay in acting on prior warnings—especially from Indian intelligence—raises serious questions about the real motivations behind the inaction. The attacks occurred just months before the presidential election, fueling nationalist rhetoric and providing the perfect political platform for Gotabaya Rajapaksa, a former military man, to sweep into power on promises of national security and strong leadership.

This strategic exploitation of terrorism for electoral advantage strongly echoes Pakistan’s history of using militancy to influence domestic and regional dynamics. Rajapaksa’s ascent was widely seen as a direct political consequence of the attacks, and his campaign repeatedly emphasized the state’s failure to protect its citizens—a failure from which he and his allies ultimately benefited (Fernando, 2021). The parallels with the Pakistani ISI’s use of fear-based narratives to reinforce military dominance are striking, reinforcing suspicions that Sri Lanka may have borrowed from the ISI playbook.

In the aftermath of the bombings, multiple reports have emerged indicating that key witnesses and investigative figures were either silenced or eliminated. Journalists and political analysts have highlighted several high-profile assassinations and mysterious disappearances, suggesting an orchestrated campaign to suppress the truth (Fernando, 2021). The lack of judicial progress and political will to pursue these leads has further fueled public suspicion and has been seen by civil society actors as an attempt to insulate the security establishment from accountability.

Despite this, Sri Lanka’s diverse and resilient civil society has played a crucial role in preventing a spiral of sectarian violence following the attacks. Christian, Muslim, and Hindu religious leaders engaged in rapid interfaith dialogue to ease tensions and prevent retaliatory attacks. Grassroots organizations also worked to rebuild communal trust and maintain a fragile peace. These efforts starkly contrast with Pakistan’s trajectory, where civil society has been systematically undermined by state institutions and dissent is often met with enforced disappearances or violent suppression (International Crisis Group, 2019).

Disinformation and narrative control have also played a key role in obscuring the truth behind the Easter Sunday attacks. Prominent Sri Lankan academic Professor Rohan Gunaratna, known internationally as a terrorism expert, has been criticized for echoing state-sanctioned interpretations of the events. Gunaratna has repeatedly emphasized the ISIS connection while downplaying or ignoring evidence suggesting local political and military involvement. According to Cronau (2024), such positioning contributes to a culture of disinformation that shields influential actors from scrutiny and undermines genuine investigative journalism.

The deliberate use of misinformation by individuals in academia—often seen as neutral, credible voices—represents a troubling dimension of state control. When scholars serve as unofficial mouthpieces for the state, the boundary between truth and propaganda becomes dangerously blurred. This tactic also finds echoes in Pakistan, where academics and think tanks aligned with military interests often dominate media and policy discourses, creating an intellectual ecosystem that reinforces state narratives while marginalizing dissenting voices (Abou Zahab, 2005).

What unites the cases of Pakistan and Sri Lanka is a disturbing trend: the militarization of domestic politics through the orchestration or manipulation of terrorism. In both contexts, state intelligence agencies appear to have engaged in operations that serve political masters rather than public safety. These operations create cycles of violence, mistrust, and authoritarian consolidation, posing grave threats to democratic accountability and civil liberties.

Addressing these systemic issues requires more than surface-level reforms. Independent investigative mechanisms, transparency in intelligence operations, and a strong, autonomous judiciary are necessary to counteract the influence of rogue intelligence elements. Civil society and the media must be empowered to hold state actors accountable, and international pressure should be applied where states fail to meet human rights obligations.

In sum, the cases of Pakistan’s ISI and Sri Lanka’s Directorate of Military Intelligence illustrate how intelligence services, originally designed to safeguard national security, can evolve into instruments of political engineering. When states orchestrate violence for electoral or strategic advantage, the very foundations of democracy and peace are put at risk. The international community must recognize and respond to these patterns with a unified call for accountability, justice, and the restoration of democratic norms.

References

Abou Zahab, M. (2005). The Islamist movement in Pakistan: State, society and conflict. In Jaffrelot, C. (Ed.), Pakistan: Nationalism without a nation? (pp. 283–294). Zed Books.

Cohen, S. P. (2013). The idea of Pakistan. Brookings Institution Press.

Cronau, P. (2024). State complicity and academic disinformation: The Rohan Gunaratna case. Asia Investigative Review, 12(1), 45–67.

Fernando, M. (2021). Easter bombings and the road to power: The Rajapaksa strategy. Sri Lanka Political Review, 18(2), 112–134.

International Crisis Group. (2019). After Sri Lanka’s Easter bombings: Reducing risks of future violence (Asia Report No. 302). https://www.crisisgroup.org

Riedel, B. (2012). Deadly embrace: Pakistan, America, and the future of the global jihad. Brookings Institution Press.

Samarasinghe, J. (2021). Intelligence failures and political strategy: Unpacking the 2019 Easter Sunday bombings. Journal of South Asian Security Studies, 7(3), 89–109.