intelligence

Deconstructing the 2019 Sri Lanka Easter Sunday Bombings: A False Flag Operation?

This article examines the 2019 Easter Sunday bombings in Sri Lanka, analyzing them through the lens of a possible false flag operation. It critically engages with geopolitical, intelligence, and political dimensions, linking the attack to broader international power struggles between China, India, and the United States. Drawing from intelligence leaks, insider testimonies, and investigative reports, this paper explores the possibility that elements within Sri Lankan intelligence facilitated or exploited the attack for strategic and political gains. The implications of this analysis extend to the study of state-sponsored terrorism, intelligence manipulation, and the future of counterterrorism policies in South Asia.

Introduction

On April 21, 2019, a series of coordinated suicide bombings targeted churches and hotels across Sri Lanka, killing over 250 people. The official narrative attributes the attacks to the local Islamist extremist group National Thowheeth Jama’ath (NTJ), allegedly acting under the influence of ISIS (Gunaratna, 2021). However, growing evidence suggests the attack was not simply an act of terrorism but rather a complex intelligence operation aimed at reshaping Sri Lanka’s political and security landscape (Channel 4 News, 2023). This article critically assesses whether the bombings were orchestrated or manipulated as a false flag operation to facilitate a regime change and enhance foreign strategic influence over Sri Lanka.

Content Analysis of the Easter Sunday Attack

A significant component of analyzing the Easter Sunday bombings involves scrutinizing existing literature and reports on the topic. The credibility of sources such as Rohan Gunaratna’s Sri Lanka’s Easter Sunday Massacre: Lessons for the International Community (2023) has been questioned due to his well-documented ties with the Sri Lankan government. According to Borham and Singh (2019), Gunaratna’s narrative aligns closely with state propaganda, raising concerns about its objectivity. Investigative journalist Peter Cronau (2024) further asserts that Gunaratna’s works often function as psychological operations rather than independent counterterrorism analyses.

Kagusthan Ariaratnam (2020) critically examines the intelligence failures leading up to the attacks and argues that these failures may not have been accidental but rather intentional manipulations to serve political interests. His analysis aligns with David Miller and Tom Mills’ (2009) study on how terrorism experts, particularly those embedded within government institutions, frame attacks to serve strategic goals. Meanwhile, Hughes (2003) raises concerns about Gunaratna’s selective use of evidence, which calls into question the reliability of his assertions regarding the masterminds of the Easter Sunday bombings.

The Sri Lankan government’s response to the bombings has also been criticized by Cardinal Malcolm Ranjith, who addressed the United Nations Human Rights Council (2022) and called for an independent international investigation into the attack. His claims align with reports from Tamil advocacy groups, such as the one by Sachi Sri Kantha (2003), who describes Gunaratna as a propagandist fostering divisions rather than a legitimate counterterrorism expert.

Beyond governmental influences, digital rhetoric and media narratives play a crucial role in shaping public perception of such incidents. Douglas Eyman (2015) highlights how digital platforms can be used to either reinforce or challenge mainstream narratives regarding acts of terrorism. Russell Frank (2015) builds on this argument by identifying how fake news and misinformation are often deployed to serve political ends, particularly in high-stakes scenarios like the Easter bombings. Given Gunaratna’s extensive media presence and influence over Sri Lanka’s counterterrorism discourse, these studies offer crucial insights into how the bombings have been framed within both national and international media landscapes.

The Official Narrative and Its Contradictions

The Sri Lankan government attributes the attack solely to NTJ, with support from ISIS (Presidential Commission Report, 2020). Intelligence failures are cited as the primary reason for the government’s inability to prevent the attack (GoSL, 2020). The official report denies any involvement of state intelligence agencies, framing the incident as a lapse in security rather than a coordinated effort involving higher authorities.

Multiple investigative reports, including Channel 4’s exposé, suggest state complicity in either allowing or facilitating the attack (Channel 4 News, 2023). High-ranking intelligence officers claim Sri Lanka’s military intelligence and external actors played a role in engineering the crisis (Anonymous Source, 2023). The attack conveniently preceded Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s presidential election victory, raising questions about its timing and whether the resulting political shift was an intended outcome (Samarasinghe, 2021).

Intelligence Failures or Strategic Facilitation?

India’s intelligence agency RAW provided specific warnings weeks before the attack (Indian Intelligence Report, 2019). Despite receiving detailed intelligence on potential targets, Sri Lankan authorities failed to act (GoSL, 2020). Whistleblowers suggest intelligence failures were not accidental but deliberate, aimed at creating conditions favorable to specific political and strategic interests (Channel 4 News, 2023).

Former intelligence operatives allege that NTJ operatives were closely monitored but allowed to proceed with their plans (Anonymous Source, 2023). Channel 4’s investigation implicated Suresh Sallay, head of the State Intelligence Service (SIS), in coordinating elements of the attack, further fueling suspicions of state involvement (Channel 4 News, 2023). Reports suggest Sri Lankan military intelligence may have had motivations for enabling a crisis that justified greater political control, leading to widespread militarization and suppression of civil liberties (Fernando, 2021).

Conclusion

This paper has explored the 2019 Easter Sunday bombings as a potential false flag operation, challenging the conventional terrorist attack narrative. The analysis of existing literature reveals that much of the official story is shaped by government-affiliated sources, particularly Rohan Gunaratna, whose credibility has been widely contested. Independent investigative reports, religious figures, and digital media analyses present a more complex picture, one that suggests political manipulation and intelligence complicity. While the lack of direct evidence prevents definitive conclusions, the suspicious intelligence failures, geopolitical motivations, and subsequent political shifts strongly suggest state complicity. A transparent international investigation is imperative to determine the full scope of responsibility and prevent similar incidents in the future.


References

  • Ariaratnam, K. (2020). Special Report: Sri Lanka’s Easter Sunday Bombings – An Intelligence Failure? Or an Intelligence Operation? NAOC.
  • Borham, M., & Singh, A. (2019). Rohan Gunaratna Debunked? Sunday Observer.
  • Channel 4 News. (2023). Sri Lanka’s Easter Bombings: An Inside Job? Channel 4 Investigations.
  • Cronau, P. (2024). The Legitimising of Terror Fears: Research or Psy Ops? Pacific Journalism Review.
  • Eyman, D. (2015). Digital Rhetoric: Theory, Method, Practice. University of Michigan Press.
  • Frank, R. (2015). Caveat Lector: Fake News as Folklore. The Journal of American Folklore.
  • Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL). (2020). Presidential Commission Report on the Easter Sunday Attacks.
  • Gunaratna, R. (2023). Sri Lanka’s Easter Sunday Massacre: Lessons for the International Community. Penguin Books.
  • Sri Kantha, S. (2003). On Rohan Gunaratna: The ‘Temple Drum’ of Terrorism Industry. Sangam.
  • U.S. Department of State. (2021). Indo-Pacific Strategy Report.

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About Kagusthan Ariaratnam

Kagusthan Ariaratnam is a defense analyst based in Ottawa with over 25 years of experience. He was previously a child soldier for the Tamil Tigers. From 1990 to 2010, he held significant roles with several international intelligence agencies. In 1992, Ariaratnam was appointed as an intelligence officer for the Tamil Tigers' Military Intelligence Service. Between 1992 and 1995, he oversaw intelligence operations for the Sea Tigers and the Air Tigers, which served as the organization's rudimentary naval and air wings. Ariaratnam possesses unique insights into contemporary counterintelligence, counterinsurgency, and counterterrorism operations. He fought as an insurgent during the Sri Lankan civil war with the Tamil Tigers and later served as a military intelligence analyst with the Directorate of Military Intelligence for the Sri Lankan government, opposing those same insurgents. In recognition of his contributions to the "Global War on Terrorism," Ariaratnam received the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies Award in October 2003. He is currently pursuing studies in digital journalism at the University of Ottawa and leads Project O Five Ltd. If you wish to contact him, you can reach him via email at [email protected].

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